

*Communist Party of Spain*

The Communist Party of Spain (Partido Comunista de España—PCE) had its beginnings in Spain during the revolutionary upsurge that followed World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. The Spanish communists did not become as strong a force as their counterparts in other European countries, however, largely because of the existence in Spain of strong socialist and anarchist movements that already occupied the left end of the political spectrum. PCE membership, never very large in the party's early years of activity, declined dramatically under the repression carried out by the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera in the 1920s (see *The Africa War and the Authoritarian Regime of Miguel Primo de Rivera*, ch. 1). Communist influence on the left increased when the PCE ceased attacking the Socialists and other leftist organizations and shifted toward a popular front strategy in 1934.

During the Civil War, the leftist forces were again divided. The communists were intent on finishing the war against the fascist forces before beginning their social and political revolution, whereas other leftist organizations were not willing to postpone the restructuring of Spanish society. The communists were brutal in their suppression of competing leftist organizations, which led to the party's ostracism by the other anti-Franco forces in the post-Civil War period.

In the mid-1950s, the PCE began vigorous efforts to break out of its isolation and adapted policies designed to bring together a broad coalition of parties, under PCE leadership, to oppose the Franco dictatorship. Ironically, it was the Franco regime itself, by focusing its attacks on the PCE, that enabled the party to become a rallying point for dissident students and workers. The party built a political base around the trade union movement known as the CCOO, and by the end of the Franco era the PCE, under the leadership of Santiago Carrillo, was the most effective political organization in Spain.

The PCE failed to take the initiative as this authoritarian regime drew to a close, however, and expectations of a hegemonic role for the PCE on the Spanish left were not realized. Although PCE membership multiplied following the party's legalization in 1977, the PCE received only 9 percent of the popular vote in the elections held that year; dominance on the left went to the rival PSOE (see *Transition to Democracy*, ch. 1). After the PCE's share of the vote fell to 3.8 percent in the 1982 elections, internal tensions within the party reached crisis proportions, and Carrillo's leadership began to be questioned.

As had been the case for the PSOE, the PCE found that the burden of dogmatic Marxism reduced its appeal for the electorate. Carrillo had succeeded in eliminating the word "Leninism" from the PCE statutes at a party congress in 1978, over substantial opposition. He continued to be criticized by the pro-Soviet militants within the party, who urged him to take a more revolutionary approach. At the same time, a more European-oriented group, known as the renovators, agitated for modernization and for more internal debate within the party.

In addition to ideologically based dissension, there was also general dissatisfaction with Carrillo's increasingly inflexible leadership. His repeated purges of those members who opposed him further decimated and demoralized the party. Following the PCE's decisive defeat in the October 1982 elections, Carrillo resigned as secretary general of the party; he was replaced by Gerardo Iglesias.

In succeeding months, splinter groups broke away from the PCE, further depleting its support to form pro-Soviet or Marxist-Leninist parties. Among these were the pro-Soviet Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain (Partido Comunista de los Pueblos de España—PCPE) and the Communist Party of Spain—Marxist-Leninist (Partido Comunista de España—Marxista-Leninista—PCE-ML). Within the PCE, Carrillo strongly opposed Iglesias's policies. He was particularly critical of the latter's proposal to form a coalition of all progressive forces that were to the left of the PSOE. This conflict led to Carrillo's expulsion from the central committee of the party, in April 1985. He subsequently organized and led the Committee for Communist Unity (Mesa para Unidad de los Comunistas—MUC), which in December 1986 formed a new pro-Soviet party named the Spanish Workers' Party-Communist Unity (Partido de los Trabajadores de España-Unidad Comunista—PTE-UC). By the end of 1987, there were indications of efforts on the part of the PCE, PCPE, and the PTE-UC to unify the three communist parties in time for the next general elections. The PCE and the PCPE, together with several other small leftist parties, formed an electoral coalition, the IU, to contest the national elections in 1986 as well as the regional and municipal elections in 1987.

The PCE convened its Twelfth Party Congress in February 1988 amid mounting agitation for a major revitalization of the party, which was plagued by financial problems and by a lack of unity. Although Iglesias had initiated the policy of a united left and had ended the decimating party purges, critics felt that stronger measures as well as more effective leadership were necessary to mobilize the left and to improve the PCE's showing at the polls. At the party congress, Julio Anguita was chosen to succeed Iglesias. Party

members reaffirmed their commitment to workers' interests, and they adopted policies aimed at attracting environmentalists and pacifists to their ranks.

### ***Popular Alliance***

The Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular—AP) was a conservative right-wing party founded in 1976 by former Franco ministers under the leadership of Fraga, who had helped to prepare the way for reform during the Franco era and who had expected to play a key role in post-Franco governments. He underestimated the popular desire for change and distaste for Francoism, and he advocated an extremely gradual transition to democracy. Although Fraga had originally intended to convey a reformist image, his party was perceived by the electorate as both reactionary and authoritarian. Fraga's own outbursts of temper and the close ties of many of the AP candidates to the previous regime contributed to this perception. When elections were held in June 1977, the AP garnered only 8.3 percent of the vote.

In the months following the 1977 elections, dissension erupted within the AP over constitutional issues that arose as the draft document was being formulated. The more reactionary members voted against the draft constitution, and they advocated a shift to the right. Fraga, however, wanted to move the AP toward the political center in order to form a larger center-right party. Most of the disenchanted reactionaries left the AP, and Fraga and the remaining AP members joined other more moderately conservative party leaders to form the Democratic Coalition (Coalición Democrática—CD). It was hoped that this new coalition would capture the support of those who had voted for the UCD in 1977, but who had become disenchanted with the Suárez government. When elections were held in March 1979, however, the CD received only 6.1 percent of the vote. Deeply disappointed, Fraga resigned as head of his party.

By the time of the AP's Third Party Congress in December 1979, party leaders were reassessing their involvement in the CD. Many felt that the creation of the coalition had merely confused the voters, and they sought to emphasize the AP's independent identity. Fraga resumed control of the party, and the political resolutions adopted by the party congress reaffirmed the conservative orientation of the AP.

In the early 1980s, Fraga succeeded in rallying the various components of the right around his leadership. He was aided in his efforts to revive the AP by the increasing disintegration of the UCD. In the general elections held in October 1982, the AP gained votes

both from previous UCD supporters and from the far right, and it became the major opposition party, securing 25.4 percent of the popular vote. Whereas the AP's parliamentary representation had dropped to 9 seats in 1979, the party allied itself with the small right-wing PDP and won 106 seats in 1982. The increased strength of the AP was further evidenced in the municipal and regional elections held in May 1983, when the party drew 26 percent of the vote. A significant portion of the electorate appeared to support the AP's emphasis on law and order as well as its probusiness policies.

Subsequent political developments belied the party's aspirations to continue increasing its base of support. Prior to the June 1986 elections, the AP once again joined forces with the PDP, and along with the PL, formed the CP, in another attempt to expand its constituency to include the center of the political spectrum. The coalition called for stronger measures against terrorism, for more privatization, and for a reduction in spending and in taxes. The CP failed to increase its share of the vote in the 1986 elections, however, and it soon began to disintegrate.

When regional elections in late 1986 resulted in further losses for the coalition, Fraga resigned as AP president, although he retained his parliamentary seat. At the party congress in February 1987, Hernández was chosen to head the AP, declaring that under his leadership the AP would become a "modern right-wing European party." But Hernández lacked political experience at the national level, and the party continued to decline. When support for the AP plummeted in the municipal and regional elections held in June 1987, there was increased likelihood that it would be overtaken as major opposition party by Suárez's CDS.

### *Democratic and Social Center*

The Democratic and Social Center (Centro Democrático y Social—CDS) was organized shortly before the October 1982 elections by Suárez, who had been the principal architect of the transition to a democratic system after the death of Franco. After he resigned as both prime minister of Spain and president of the UCD in January 1981, Suárez continued to struggle for control of the party machine. When he failed in his bid to regain party leadership in July 1982, he abandoned the party he had created and formed the CDS. The new centrist party fared poorly in the October general elections, gaining only two parliamentary seats.

By 1986 the party's fortunes had improved dramatically under the leadership of the former prime minister. In the June elections, the CDS more than tripled its share of the vote, which was

9.2 percent in 1986, compared with 2.9 percent in 1982, indicating that many who had previously voted for the UCD had transferred their support to the CDS. In the electoral campaign, Suárez had focused on his own experience as head of the government; he had criticized the PSOE for not fulfilling its 1982 election promises, had advocated a more independent foreign policy, and had called for economic measures that would improve the lot of the poor. This strategy enabled him to draw some votes from those who had become disillusioned with the PSOE.

In the municipal and the regional elections held in June 1987, the largest gains were made by the CDS. A poll taken at the end of 1987 revealed even stronger support for the party, and it gave Suárez a popularity rating equal to that of González. Suárez's call for less dependence on the United States appealed to the latent anti-Americanism in the populace, and his advocacy of a greater role for the state in providing social services and in ensuring a more equitable distribution of income struck a responsive chord among the workers, who were growing increasingly impatient with González's conservative economic policies. Nevertheless, it remained to be seen how far Suárez's populist rhetoric would take him in his quest to challenge the PSOE.

### ***Other National Parties***

Smaller parties emerged during the 1970s and the 1980s, and they frequently became part of various coalitions. The PDP had been a component of the UCD, but it re-established its separate identity in 1982, joining with the AP for the October 1982 electoral campaign and forming part of the CP during the June 1986 elections. The PL, founded in 1977, also allied with the CP in 1986. The centrist Democratic Reformist Party (Partido Reformista Democrático—PRD), established in 1984, stressed decentralization and greater independence for local party leaders. A new radical right-wing party also emerged in 1984, the Spanish Integration Committees (Juntas Españolas de Integración). Founded by former Franco ministers, the party presented an updated version of the Falangism of the Franco regime. Another extreme right-wing party, the National Front (Frente Nacional—FN), was formed in October 1986. On the left, the radical Progressive Federation (Federación Progresista—FP) called for greater decentralization and for a neutralist foreign policy.

Special interest groups also established political organizations. The Spanish Green Party (Partido Verde Español—PVE) convened its first party congress in February 1985. The group focused on wide-ranging environmentalist concerns, and it opposed NATO

membership for Spain. There was also a Feminist Party (Partido Feminista—PF) that focused primarily on education.

### *Regional Parties*

Spain's system of political parties was complicated by the existence of regional parties that were active both at the regional level, and, when they had seats in the Cortes, at the national level (see table 14, Appendix). In most autonomous communities, politics was dominated by regional affiliates of one of the two national parties, the PSOE and the AP, with the PSOE controlling the greater number of regions. In some of the autonomous communities, however, these regional offshoots had to form coalitions with truly local parties if they wished to govern. Only the Basque Country and Catalonia had regional parties that were strong enough to set the political agenda; the most important were the PNV and the Catalan electoral coalition, Convergence and Union (*Convergència i Unió—CiU*). These two moderately right-wing parties routinely won seats in the Cortes, and the CiU did well enough in regional elections to govern Catalonia, if it chose, without the aid of coalition partners. It was also the only regional party that had a decisive role in politics on the national level. This foremost exponent of Catalan nationalism occasionally supplied important parliamentary support to the UCD in the late 1970s. By far the second most important party in Catalonia was the regional offshoot of the PSOE, the Socialists' Party of Catalonia (*Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya—PSC*).

The Catalan party system in general was characterized by pragmatism and by moderation. By contrast, the Basque national parties were beset by polarization, fragmentation, and political violence. In 1986 a group of PNV dissidents, unhappy with both the party's economic conservatism and its willingness to cooperate with the PSOE's stern antiterrorist measures, split from the party to form the more radical organization named Basque Solidarity (*Eusko Alkartasuna—EA*). In addition, there were two more extreme Basque nationalist groups, the Basque Left (*Euskadiko Ezkerra—EE*) and the HB. The more radical of these was the HB, which included Marxist-Leninist revolutionary and ultranationalist groups and which was closely linked to the ETA-M. The party emphasized social revolution and armed struggle for Basque independence. The EE party was believed to be tied to the less violent ETA Political-Military Front (*ETA Político-Militar—ETA-PM*) (see *Threats to Internal Security*, ch. 5). These nationalist parties almost invariably won seats in the Cortes.

## **Political Interest Groups**


The revitalized pluralism that accompanied liberalization in Spain after Franco gave rise to new forms of popular participation in the country's political process. At the same time, it redefined the existing political forces, such as the army and the Roman Catholic Church (see *Constitutional System*, this ch.). Article 9 of the 1978 Constitution calls on public authorities to facilitate the participation of all citizens in the political, the economic, the cultural, and the social life of the country. After forty years of depoliticization, Spanish citizens began to play an increasingly active role in the nation's development, through involvement in the various interest groups that were established or reactivated along with the political parties.

### ***Labor***

The labor movement, which had been a major component of support for the Republican forces in the Civil War, was brutally suppressed after the Nationalists came to power. Vertical syndicates replaced trade unions, and strikes were outlawed (see *The Franco Years*, ch. 1). Nevertheless, mounting strike activity in the 1960s and the 1970s, which persisted in spite of severe reprisals, testified to the strength of the labor movement, which was a key factor in propelling Spain toward a democratic form of government.

The political changes that swept through Spain in the wake of liberalization were not accompanied by commensurate changes in social and economic conditions. One of the reasons for this was the labor movement's reluctance to voice strong criticisms of the governing UCD for fear of provoking a military coup. Because of the army's apparent ambivalence toward the nascent democratic system, the parties on the left and the labor movement, which normally would have been expected to agitate for a significant restructuring of the economy and of society, adopted an attitude of cooperation and consensus with the government (see *Transition to Democracy*, ch. 1). Although this stance contributed to the success of the transition process, it nevertheless had the effect of postponing necessary societal reforms. The consequences of this delay were a salient factor in the labor unrest that reached crisis proportions in the late 1980s.

Decree laws in March and in April 1977 legalized trade unions and introduced the rights to strike and to engage in collective bargaining. The 1978 Constitution delineates the rights of unions to defend their interests. It grants to all citizens, except members of the armed forces and the judiciary, the right to join a union. It



*The Benedictine Monastery of Montserrat, located to the northwest of Barcelona, is a bastion of Catalan culture.  
Courtesy James Scofield*

also guarantees them the right not to join one. The first major labor legislation enacted under the 1978 Constitution, the Workers' Statute that came into force in 1980, further elaborated the rights of workers. It included guarantees pertaining to a minimum wage and to social security, and it stipulated that labor relations were to be worked out between unions and management, with no direct government involvement. The statute outlined the format for collective bargaining, recognizing the right of the elected representatives of the workers to negotiate on their behalf.

The basic freedoms and rights of unions were given more detailed treatment in the Organic Law on Trade Union Freedom, which went into effect in August 1985. This law spelled out the negotiating role to which larger unions were entitled, and it prohibited any form of discrimination on the part of employers. An earlier government labor statute called for syndical elections to be held every two years, and these provided an indication of the national strength of the labor unions.

The two principal unions were the UGT and the CCOO. The UGT, which was founded in 1888 and which had a long tradition of close ties with the PSOE, was a composite of autonomous local unions, each of which consisted of workers engaged in the same type of activity, who were organized on a provincial or regional



basis. The UGT favored the idea of increased power at the local level, and allowed local unions to call work stoppages independently. In the 1982 union elections, the UGT gained a greater share of the vote than the CCOO, which had dominated previous syndical elections.

The CCOO has a shorter history than the UGT, having developed out of locally organized groups of workers that functioned both legally and clandestinely during the Franco dictatorship. Reforms enacted in the late 1950s allowed for the election of factory committees that rapidly evolved into permanent bodies representing the interests of the workers. Although the founding members of this new labor movement were independent socialists and leftist Roman Catholics as well as communists, it was the PCE that emerged as the dominant force within the movement; the majority of leadership positions were held by PCE members.

As these workers' organizations, called commissions, grew in strength and began to proliferate, the Francoist authorities cracked down, outlawing them in 1967. This did not stop their activities. By the time of Franco's death, the CCOO was the dominant force in the labor movement. It subsequently declined in strength, in part because of the PCE's decreased electoral support and the concomitant ascendancy of the PSOE.

Like the UGT, the CCOO was organized into federations of workers, based on the type of work they performed. These groups were in turn linked together as confederations in territorial congresses. A national congress met every other year. The structure of the CCOO was more centralized than that of the UGT; decisions made at the top were expected to be carried out throughout the lower echelons of the union.

The CCOO claimed to be politically independent, but the union had strong historical links with the PCE, and its important leaders were also prominent communists. Communist ideology prevailed, although the union began assuming a tactical distance from the PCE in the 1980s, as the party became weakened by internal divisions and lost support at the polls.

The UGT made no effort to de-emphasize its links with the PSOE. Both union and party frequently reiterated their common aspirations, although there were disagreements between them as well as within their respective organizations. The political ties of both the UGT and the CCOO were salient factors in the rivalry that existed between the two unions.

In addition to these two major unions, other labor organizations remained active and influential in Spain in the late 1980s. The Workers' Syndical Union (*Unión Sindical Obrera—USO*) was

among those that developed in opposition to the Franco regime. Many of its founding members had been involved in the Catholic workers' organizations, and they were strongly anticommunist. At the same time, they sought to replace capitalism with control of production by the workers. Militant in its early days, the USO had evolved into the most politically conservative of the major federations by the 1980s.

A more radical trade union, the anarcho-syndicalist National Confederation of Labor (*Confederación Nacional del Trabajo—CNT*), was the second oldest labor organization in Spain; it had been a major political force during the Second Republic. Failing to re-establish its working-class base after the Franco period, it found its principal support among white-collar workers. It boycotted syndical elections as elements of bourgeois democracy and preferred direct action strategies.

Two smaller unions that developed as splinter groups from the CCOO were the extreme left Confederation of United Workers' Unions (*Confederación de Sindicatos Unitarios de Trabajadores—CSUT*) and the United Syndicate (*Sindicato Unitario—SU*). Both were linked to Maoist political parties; their aim was to present a distinctly radical alternative to the moderation of the major federations. Although they gained some support in the 1978 union elections, their influence has steadily declined.

In addition, there were regional unions, two of which gained sufficient support to qualify for a formal place in negotiating procedures. These were the Basque Workers' Solidarity (*Eusko Langilleen Alkartasuna-Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos—ELA-STV*), which was closely linked to the PNV, and the National Galician Workers' Union (*Intersindical Nacional de Trabajadores Gallegos—INTG*).

Although trade unions were highly visible and influential in the political process, they all, with the exception of the ELA-STV, suffered from small memberships. While studies indicated that less than 20 percent of the wage-earning population was affiliated with a union, even fewer of these workers maintained their dues payments, leaving the trade unions in a financially weak position (see *Labor Relations in the Post-Franco Period*, ch. 3).

Nevertheless, labor unions continued to maintain a high profile in the political arena. Throughout 1987 and 1988, periodic strikes plagued the PSOE government and disrupted the day-to-day functioning of the country. These strikes had the backing of the UGT. Discontent within the labor movement was dramatized when the UGT leader, Redondo, formerly close to González, resigned his seat in parliament in protest against government policies. He gave

voice to the widespread feeling that the PSOE's economic policies were benefiting business at the expense of the working class. In October 1987, the UGT and the CCOO agreed to stage joint demonstrations against the government's pay and pension policies, and in December 1988 they staged a general strike (see Political Developments, 1982-88, this ch.).

### ***Business***

Throughout the Franco years, a relatively small financial elite of businessmen and bankers exercised a considerable amount of power through personal influence and connections rather than through support from organized interest groups. Moreover, the interests of the business community were generally compatible with those of the Franco dictatorship: both wanted stability and economic prosperity. In the later years of the regime, business leaders, influenced by their contacts with Western Europe, came to favor more economically liberal policies; many of these leaders became vigorous proponents of economic and political modernization.

Many members of the financial elite under Franco continued to hold positions of authority after his death. Constitutional and statutory provisions enacted under the new democratic regime provided more formalized structures to represent their interests and those of the wider business community. In the early days of democratic government, a large number of employers' organizations came into being. Some of these were based on regions; a larger number were organized according to the type of business activity involved. In 1977 these diverse organizations were brought together in the Spanish Confederation of Employers' Organizations (Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales—CEOE). This group subsequently became one of the strongest supporters of the AP. A separate confederation, the Spanish Confederation of Small and Medium-Sized Firms (Confederación Española de Pequeñas y Medianas Empresas—CEPYME), was incorporated into the CEOE in 1980. It maintained a special status within the larger confederation, and when agreements were reached with the government and the unions, the CEPYME was a separate signatory.

The CEOE was a highly consolidated organization, representing almost all of Spain's companies, other than those that were owned or controlled by the government. Two other national associations endeavored, with little success, to become the representatives of smaller-scale businesses: the General Confederation of Small and Medium-Sized Firms of Spain (Confederación General de las

Pequeñas y Medianas Empresas del Estado Español—COPYME) and the Union of Small and Medium-Sized Firms (Unión de la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa—UNIPYME).

In addition to employers' organizations, chambers of commerce endeavored to further the economic interests of their members by providing a variety of services to the firms and the individuals they represented. They had an international role as well, and they assisted in export promotion and trade missions.

The greatest degree of political influence within Spain's business community was exercised by the country's large private banks. During the Franco regime, the banking sector provided crucial financial support for Franco, and he in turn enacted measures that were to its benefit. For example, he prohibited the founding of new banks from 1936 to 1962, thereby further concentrating the power of the larger banks. These banks controlled large sectors of industry, directly and indirectly, and they collaborated with government institutions in directing Spain's economic expansion (see *Banking*, ch. 3).

The traditionally powerful position of the banks was eroded somewhat during the economic recession of the 1970s and by increased government intervention in banking under the democratic regime. The inability of the leaders of the largest banks to transcend their mutual rivalries also attenuated the influence of this potentially formidable interest group. Nevertheless, they remained the single largest grouping of economic and financial interests in Spain, with close links to the government. Banks gained additional leverage by providing financial assistance to the frequently short-funded political parties.

### ***Roman Catholic Church***

Church and state have been closely linked in Spain for centuries. With the reinstatement of the Inquisition in Spain in the fifteenth century, the state employed draconian measures to enforce religious unity in an effort to ensure political unity. Strong measures to separate church and state were enacted under the short-lived Second Republic, but they were nullified by the victorious Nationalists. In the early years of the Franco regime, church and state had a close and mutually beneficial association. The loyalty of the Roman Catholic Church to the Francoist state lent legitimacy to the dictatorship, which in turn restored and enhanced the church's traditional privileges (see *The Franco Years*, ch. 1).

After the Second Vatican Council in 1965 set forth the church's stand on human rights, the church in Spain moved from a position of unswerving support for Franco's rule to one of guarded

criticism. During the final years of the dictatorship, the church withdrew its support from the regime and became one of its harshest critics. This evolution in the church's position divided Spanish Catholics. Within the institution, right-wing sentiment, opposed to any form of democratic change, was typified by the Brotherhood of Spanish Priests, the members of which published vitriolic attacks on church reformers. Opposition took a more violent form in such groups as the rightist Catholic terrorist organization known as the Warriors of Christ the King, which assaulted progressive priests and their churches.

Whereas this reactionary faction was vociferous in its resistance to any change within the church, other Spanish Catholics were frustrated at the slow pace of reform in the church and in society, and they became involved in various leftist organizations. In between these extreme positions, a small, but influential, group of Catholics—who had been involved in lay Catholic organizations such as Catholic Action—favored liberalization in both the church and the regime, but they did not enter the opposition forces. They formed a study group called *Tácito*, which urged a gradual transition to a democratic monarchy. The group's members published articles advocating a Christian democratic Spain.

The church continued to be in opposition to the Franco regime throughout the dictatorship's final years. The Joint Assembly of Bishops and Priests held in 1971 marked a significant phase in the distancing of the church from the Spanish state. This group affirmed the progressive spirit of the Second Vatican Council and adopted a resolution asking the pardon of the Spanish people for the hierarchy's partisanship in the Civil War.

At the Episcopal Conference convened in 1973, the bishops demanded the separation of church and state, and they called for a revision of the 1953 Concordat. Subsequent negotiations for such a revision broke down because Franco refused to relinquish the power to veto Vatican appointments. Until his death, Franco never understood the opposition of the church. No other Spanish ruler had enacted measures so favorable to the church as Franco, and he complained bitterly about what he considered to be its ingratitude.

Because the church had already begun its transformation into a modern institution a decade before the advent of democracy to Spain, it was able to assume an influential role during the transition period that followed Franco's death. Furthermore, although disagreements over church-state relations and over political issues of particular interest to the Roman Catholic Church remained, these questions could be dealt with in a less adversarial manner under the more liberal atmosphere of the constitutional monarchy.

A revision of the Concordat was approved in July 1976 by the newly formed Suárez government. Negotiations soon followed that resulted in bilateral agreements, delineating the relationship between the Vatican and the new democratic state (see Religion, ch. 2). The 1978 Constitution confirms the separation of church and state while recognizing the role of the Roman Catholic faith in Spanish society (see The 1978 Constitution, this ch.).

Within this basic framework for the new relationship between the church and the government, divisive issues remained to be resolved in the late 1980s. The church traditionally had exercised considerable influence in the area of education, and it joined conservative opposition parties in mounting a vigorous protest against the education reforms that impinged on its control of the schools (see Political Developments, 1982–88, this ch.). Even more acrimonious debate ensued over the emotionally charged issues of divorce and abortion. The church mobilized its considerable influence in support of a powerful lobbying effort against proposed legislation that was contrary to Roman Catholic doctrine governing these subjects. The passage of a law in 1981 legalizing civil divorce struck a telling blow against the influence of the church in Spanish society. A law legalizing abortion under certain circumstances was passed in August 1985 and further liberalized in November 1986, over the fierce opposition of the church.

Another manifestation of the redefined role of the church was contained in measures aimed at reducing, and ultimately eliminating, direct government subsidies to the church. As part of the agreements reached in 1979, the church concurred with plans for its financial independence, to be achieved during a rather lengthy transitional period. At the end of 1987, the government announced that, after a three-year trial period, the church would receive no further direct state aid but would be dependent on what citizens chose to provide, either through donations or by designating a portion of their income tax for the church. Although the church's tax-exempt status constituted an indirect subsidy, the effect of this new financial status on the church's ability to wield political influence remained to be seen.

Although church-state relations involved potentially polarizing issues, the church played a basically cooperative and supportive role in the emergence of plural democracy in Spain. Although it no longer had a privileged position in society, its very independence from politics and its visibility made it an influential force.

### *Opus Dei*

The most influential Catholic lay group during the Franco period

was the controversial Opus Dei (Work of God). This group did not fit conveniently into any political category. Although it denied any political aims, its members played pivotal roles in the modernization of the economy under Franco and in the subsequent liberalization of politics and government. At the same time, they were theologically conservative, and their desire for modernization was far from radical. They believed that economic reforms would improve society to the extent that thoroughgoing political reforms would be unnecessary.

Opus Dei was founded in 1928 by an Aragonese priest, José María Escrivá de Balaguer y Albas, and it was subsequently recognized by the Roman Catholic Church as its first secular religious institution. Although attention has been drawn primarily to its activities in Spain, it is an international body with members and associates throughout the world. Members take a vow to dedicate their professional talents to the service of God and to seek to win converts through their missionary zeal. The organization in Spain has emphasized professional excellence, and it has expected its members to serve in important government positions.

During the late 1950s and the 1960s, Opus Dei members came to control the economic ministries, and they occupied other important cabinet posts as well. This was in keeping with the organization's aim of influencing the development of society indirectly. Opus Dei recruited its members from among the brightest students, which encouraged a sense of elitism and clannishness. Because of this clannishness and the secrecy that surrounded the organization, some critics termed it the "Holy Mafia."

The Opus Dei technocrats were largely responsible for devising, introducing, and later administering the economic stabilization program that formed the basis of Spain's economic development. They encouraged competition as a means of achieving rapid economic growth, and they favored economic integration with Europe. Although these policies implied eventual political as well as economic liberalization, this was not Opus Dei's avowed goal; the group remained socially conservative, stressing personal piety and orthodox theology.

With the advent of democracy, Opus Dei lost much of its influence, and it was condemned by the more progressive forces in both the Catholic hierarchy and Spanish society for having propped up a repressive regime. Its stature was somewhat restored under Pope John Paul II, who viewed the orthodox Catholicism of the organization with favor. Opus Dei remained influential in the area of education as well as in certain sectors of the financial community.

### *Military*

Military intervention in politics has been a recurring theme in Spain since the end of the Napoleonic wars. From 1814 to 1936, Spain experienced no fewer than fifty-four attempts by the army or by groups of officers to intervene against the civilian authority. Twelve of these succeeded in overthrowing the existing regime or in abrogating its constitution. The form each of these interventions took was that of a *pronunciamiento* (pl., *pronunciamientos*), whereby a group of rebelling officers would “pronounce” what it wanted the civilian leaders to do (see Rule by Pronunciamiento, ch. 1; Historical Role of the Armed Forces, ch. 5).

The support of the armed forces was an essential factor in maintaining Franco’s forty-year dictatorship. Franco was always aware of the importance of this support, and he managed to foster the belief that the army’s interests would be served best by the continuation of his rule. Franco restored to the army its role of guarantor of the nation’s values. At the same time, Franco was aware of the dangers of a politicized army. He retained firm control of the military establishment and prevented any individual officer from gaining a power base. If a military leader became too popular or began to question Franco’s policies, he was quickly removed from any position of influence.

Following the death of Franco, King Juan Carlos and Prime Minister Suárez were able to achieve a peaceful transition to democracy by proceeding with extreme caution and consulting with the military leadership throughout the process. Thus, the military leaders retained the belief that they had the right to be consulted on matters of national importance. The democratic leftists were also aware of the ever-present possibility that reformist measures could alienate the military and could provoke a coup attempt, which led them to accept many compromises throughout the transition period.

The role of King Juan Carlos was vital in gaining the army’s acceptance of the new democratic regime. He had been trained in military academies, and he understood the viewpoint of the officer corps. He made a point of establishing close ties with the armed forces after Franco’s death in order to gain their loyalty to him as Franco’s chosen successor. At the same time, he was able to keep the government informed as to how far it could go in the reform process without provoking a military reaction.

Although many officers did not care for the political reform program set forth by Suárez, the military leaders did not express open opposition to the democratization process until the legalization of



the PCE in the spring of 1977 (see *Transition to Democracy*, ch. 1). They felt betrayed by Suárez, who had promised not to take such a step, and although there was no coup, they protested vehemently.

The independence with which the army leaders had expressed their revulsion at the government's decision highlighted the possibility that a powerful military organization could limit popular sovereignty. Subsequently, measures were taken to affirm the supremacy of civilian control. At the same time, the government took steps to assuage military opinion by allocating funds for the modernization of military equipment and for raising military salaries. Efforts also were made to rationalize the military career structure and to eliminate bottlenecks in the promotion process.

In succeeding months, the armed forces and the civilian government coexisted uneasily. Intermittent rumblings were heard from reactionary army leaders, who retained an antidemocratic mentality and who could not come to terms with their new position in society. The armed forces seethed with plots for military takeovers, and the government's leniency toward conspirators, rather than mollifying the military leaders, encouraged the plotters to more daring acts. This unstable situation was exacerbated by the escalation of terrorist violence. Army dissidents perceived the government as allowing the country to descend into anarchy, and military unrest culminated in the dramatic coup attempt of February 23, 1981. This attempted takeover was thwarted by the decisive intervention of King Juan Carlos, but conspiracies continued to be uncovered.

When the Socialists came to power in 1982, the deterrent power of the armed forces was still a factor to be considered. The PSOE government continued to be cautious in dealing with issues affecting the military, although it took a firmer stance than did its predecessors. As rumors of impending coups quieted, and as extreme right-wing parties failed to gain popular support, the government undertook stronger legal measures to bring the armed forces under the political control of the prime minister as well as to modernize and to streamline the military organization (see *The Military in National Life and Jurisdiction Over National Defense*, ch. 5).

A significant aspect of the military reorganization was the emphasis on the armed forces' role in defending the state from external, not internal, enemies. This was reinforced by Spain's entrance into NATO (see *Spain and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, this ch.). This new outward focus, combined with the general stability and conservatism of the government, helped to make military intervention in the political realm both impractical and unlikely.

*King Juan Carlos  
and Queen Sofia  
Courtesy National  
Tourist Office of Spain*



## **Mass Communications**

### ***Newspapers and Periodicals***

Under the rigorous censorship that prevailed during the Franco regime, only news favorable to the government could appear in the press, and there was little concern for the veracity of such reports. With no reliable coverage of political events, reportage diminished to a few items pertaining to society news, sports, or business.

A new press law, approved in 1966, provided a degree of liberalization for publications and eliminated prior censorship, although newspapers were expected to exercise self-censorship. The 1966 law did not usher in freedom of the press, but it did expand the scope of news that could be published; newspapers even began debating what forms of government might evolve after Franco's death.

Although the 1978 Constitution guarantees the right to disseminate information, as of mid-1988 the 1966 press law had not been replaced, and regulations dating from the Franco years had been used in attempts to control journalists who published articles offensive to the government. In addition, some observers believed that government subsidies to the press, beginning in 1979, threatened to compromise true freedom of the press.

The early post-Franco years witnessed a proliferation of newspapers and magazines, although many of these were short lived.

The enthusiasm for publishing was not matched by a commensurate eagerness for reading on the part of the populace. In part because of the prolonged repression of the dictatorship, Spaniards had lost the habit of reading newspapers. Whereas about 2,000 newspapers had appeared daily during the Second Republic, in the 1980s there were only 130 (see table 15, Appendix). This drastically reduced figure was an indication of the population's distrust of the press, although the growth of radio and television newscasts was also a factor. Spain's per capita newspaper circulation was far below that of most West European countries, and in the late 1980s less than 10 percent of the population regularly bought a daily newspaper.

By all accounts, the most influential newspaper was *El País*, founded in 1976. It played a critical role in guiding the formation of opinion in the early days of Spanish democracy. The paper maintained a liberal, factually objective viewpoint, and it appealed primarily to well-educated citizens. In the mid-1980s, it was the country's largest daily newspaper, with a circulation of 350,000 daily and 590,000 on Sundays.

The much older *ABC* was a conservative-monarchist newspaper. Founded in 1905, it enjoyed wide popularity during the Franco years, but its circulation declined after 1975. *El Alcázar* represented ultra-right wing opposition to democratic policies. Many of its articles pertained to the armed forces, because it appealed to a sector of society still nostalgic for Francoism. The oldest continuously published newspaper in Spain was *La Vanguardia*, founded in 1881 and published in Barcelona. Until the early 1980s, this conservative paper had the largest circulation in the country.

Other major daily newspapers included the Catholic rightist *Ya*, which strongly defended the church's position on such issues as divorce and abortion, and *Diario 16*, which began publication in 1975 as a spinoff of the respected weekly, *Cambio 16*. *Marca* was a popular daily newspaper, devoted exclusively to sports news. Founded in the early days of the Franco regime, it enjoyed immense popularity between 1940 and 1970, primarily because sports coverage was the only uncensored news permitted by the government. There were also a number of important regional newspapers in Catalonia (*Avui*) and in the Basque Country (*Deia* in Bilbao and *Egin* in San Sebastián) that published, at least partly, in the respective regional language; the circulation of each usually ran between 40,000 and 50,000 daily.

One large news agency, EFE, dominated the distribution of news. This national agency, which the government owned and subsidized, was controlled by the Ministry of Transportation, Tourism, and Communications. The government frequently exercised its

prerogative of appointing EFE directors. At the same time, financial aid from the state contributed to the significant growth of the agency. Observers questioned the appropriateness of newspapers' receiving their information from an agency so closely linked with the government.

In addition to newspapers, Spain had a large number of weekly and monthly periodicals that filled in the gaps in newspaper coverage. Two leading weeklies specialized in political reporting: *Cambio 16*, founded in 1972; and its more recent, somewhat sensationalist rival, *Tiempo*. Other periodicals for the most part concentrated on entertainment, social events, sports, and television. One of the most popular magazines in Spain, *Interviú*, combined unrestrained political reporting with equally uninhibited photography. This blending of political and sexual liberation proved highly attractive to Spanish readers, after Franco's repressive policies in both these areas. The best-selling magazine in Spain was the weekly television review *Tele-Indiscreta*, the large circulation of which indicated the immense popularity of television throughout the country.

### **Radio and Television**

Spain was served by four major radio networks in the late 1980s: Radio Nacional Española (RNE), controlled by the government; Radio Cadena Española (RCE), which consisted of stations formerly owned by Francoist groups; Cadena de Ondas Populares Españolas (COPE), a network supported by the Roman Catholic Church; and Sociedad Española de Radiodifusión (SER), the largest and most popular of the commercial networks.

The 1975 Geneva Conference restricted the number of networks that might operate on the medium wave in each country. In Spain, the four major networks plus one Catalan station broadcast on the medium wave as well as on frequency modulation (FM). A number of new stations and networks began broadcasting on FM after the government redistributed the franchises in 1982. The quality and the popularity of this FM programming had increased to such an extent, that in the mid-1980s, more Spaniards were listening to FM than to medium wave. In 1986 there were approximately 10.8 million radio receivers in the country.

Radio broadcasting was regulated by the General Bureau for Radio Broadcasting and Television (Dirección General de Radiodifusión y Televisión). In October 1977, the government relinquished its monopoly on radio news dissemination and declared that it would no longer require the country's nonstate radio stations to broadcast government news bulletins. News coverage

became both faster and better after the end of RNE's monopoly, as was evidenced dramatically during the February 1981 coup attempt, when radio correspondents provided vivid and timely descriptions of the night's events to a worried population, in a manner that neither the slower print media nor state-run television could match.

Of the various forms of communications media, television occupied a unique position in the shaping of Spanish social values and institutions. Spaniards received a relatively small proportion of their news and information from the print media, and they spent more time watching television than the people of any other country in Western Europe except Britain. Even most of the poorest homes had television sets, which numbered approximately 10 million in 1986.

Television was controlled by a state monopoly, Radio-Televisión Española (RTVE), the responsibility for which was shuffled from one ministry to another in the 1970s and the 1980s. Television as well as radio continued to be subject to intense government scrutiny and censorship through the early years of the post-Franco era, and the Francoist notion of television as an arm of government did not end with Franco's death. As part of agreements stemming from the Moncloa Pacts, a governing body was established to guarantee RTVE's objectivity (see *Transition to Democracy*, ch. 1). This body, called the Administrative Council, was to consist of six members elected by the Congress of Deputies in order to ensure that it would reflect the political composition of the Cortes. This council was less than vigilant in its watchdog role, however, and during the late 1970s and the 1980s there were many cases of political and financial corruption as well as mismanagement on the part of RTVE.

Spain had two national television programs: one ultrahigh frequency (UHF) and the other, very high frequency (VHF). They operated under the country's only television network, Televisión Española (TVE), which in turn was under the jurisdiction of the RTVE. In the 1980s, several autonomous governments obtained permission to build television transmission facilities for broadcasting in their regional languages.

The most noteworthy development regarding television in the late 1980s was the passage of a bill in April 1986, which, when carried out, will end the state monopoly on television by allowing three new private television networks to operate under the supervision of an independent broadcasting authority. The bill included restrictions to prevent private investors from gaining a monopoly control of a station, and it also established requirements about

programming. The bill became law on April 4, 1987, and observers noted that the introduction of commercial television might lead to an improvement in the rather erratic programming of Spanish television.

## **Foreign Relations**

Spain's remote position on the southwest periphery of Western Europe has affected much of its history, even when it belonged to the Roman, the Habsburg, and the Napoleonic empires. The Pyrenees have presented a formidable land barrier against both invasions and influences from the north. At the same time, Spain's location at the western entrance of the Mediterranean has impelled the country to play the role of an important maritime power and has enabled it to act as a bridge among Europe, Africa, and the Americas.

In the nineteenth century, Spain, beset by political instability deriving from the cataclysm of the French Revolution as well as from its own later failure to participate in the Industrial Revolution, withdrew behind its borders. After suffering a humiliating defeat by the United States in the Spanish-American War and losing its last colonies in the Philippines and the New World, Spain's focus turned even further inward. Neutral in both world wars, Spain found that its isolation deepened during the Franco years, intensified by the ostracism the country experienced because of its associations with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy.

After the Nationalist victory in the Civil War, the Franco regime devoted itself primarily to domestic affairs, relegating foreign considerations to a secondary position. The primary concerns were to establish political stability and to ensure economic reconstruction and development. Spanish diplomacy was an instrument with which the government tried to obtain political legitimacy and to gain Spain's acceptance by the international community. Franco played the leading role in pursuing these foreign policy goals, as he did in every other aspect of his government.

Spain's pariah status following World War II strengthened Franco's internal position, solidifying the support of the Spanish people behind their beleaguered leader. Nevertheless, as Spain began to benefit from mounting Cold War tensions, from signing an agreement with the United States, and from achieving United Nations (UN) membership, the siege mentality of the Spanish people lessened (see Foreign Policy under Franco, ch. 1).

## **Spain and the European Community**

As Spain began to emerge from its postwar isolation, successive

Franco cabinets sought to establish closer ties with Europe. After Franco's death, this became Spain's major diplomatic goal. The desire to be recognized as a member of the West European democratic societies was a primary motivating factor in Spain's attempts to gain membership in the European Community (EC).

Spain had become an associate member of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) in 1958 and a full member of that organization's successor, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD—see Glossary), in 1959. It also had gained membership in the World Bank (see Glossary). The EC, however, was much more reluctant to have Spain join its ranks. Agreement for a preferential commercial trade pact was reached in March 1970, after six years of negotiations, but it was a strictly economic accord. The continued existence of undemocratic governmental institutions in Spain was strongly resented by member countries of the EC, and it continued to be a barrier to Spanish accession.

Shortly after Spain's first democratically elected government in more than forty years came to power in June 1977, Prime Minister Suárez dispatched his foreign minister to Brussels to present Spain's formal application to join the EC. The major political parties in Spain, divided over other issues, all firmly supported this attempt to advance Spain's modernization as well as its international legitimation. Prospects for the approval of this application were enhanced by the implementation of democratic policies by the post-Franco governments. European attitudes toward Spain began to improve, and Spain was admitted to membership in the Council of Europe (see Glossary), in November 1977. The Spanish government's determination to continue moving in the direction of closer relations with Europe was manifested in the creation in February 1978 of a new cabinet-level position, that of minister in charge of relations with Europe.

Nevertheless, negotiations for Spain's accession to the EC were complicated and protracted. After Spain had acquired the necessary democratic credentials, the economic implications of the prospective Spanish accession caused misgivings among EC members. Spain's level of economic development was significantly lower than that of other member nations, and its industrial sector was in need of profound structural reform. There were also difficulties concerning Spain's fishing fleets. It was in the area of agriculture, however, that the potential consequences of Spanish membership created the greatest concern among EC members, particularly France. These and other factors would necessitate substantial increases in budget

expenditures on the part of the EC, which was already experiencing a financial crisis (see Spain and the European Community, ch. 3).

After lengthy bargaining, agreements were reached on these issues, and a Treaty of Accession was signed in the summer of 1985. On January 1, 1986, Spain finally entered the EC, along with Portugal. The terms of the Treaty of Accession were less than favorable to Spain, making the country a net contributor to the EC budget for several years, but there was no popular or governmental protest. A major nonpartisan foreign policy objective had been achieved, and most Spaniards savored the long-awaited feeling of formal inclusion in the West European society of nations.

Their enthusiasm was tempered in subsequent months, as issues, such as the barring of Spanish fishermen from Moroccan waters because of an EC dispute with Morocco, made clear that not all aspects of EC membership would be beneficial to Spain. A poll taken in the spring of 1987 revealed that a large majority of Spaniards believed that entry into the EC had not helped Spain. Farmers were particularly dissatisfied with the consequences of the EC's Common Agricultural Policy. Nevertheless, the same poll indicated that a majority of Spaniards favored EC membership and that their sense of being "citizens of Europe" was increasing.

### **Spain and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization**

Even though popular and official opinion had been virtually unanimous in favoring Spain's accession to the EC, considerable doubts were expressed with regard to Spanish membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Spain's significant geographical position, astride some of the world's major sea, air, and land communication routes, made it a valuable potential partner for the alliance. Spanish proponents of NATO membership argued that these same geopolitical considerations made such membership equally advantageous to Spain, because the country's strategic location could make it an obvious target in any major conflict unless it had allied support. They also maintained that integration into NATO would ensure sorely needed modernization of Spain's armed services in addition to the securing of adequate national defense. A corollary hope was that NATO membership would reorient the focus of army leaders away from reactionary preoccupations and toward defense of the West.

Many political forces in Spain, particularly the socialists and the communists, did not agree that full membership would benefit the country's defense and foreign policy aims. On the contrary, they felt it would raise the level of tension between the rival power blocs



and would make Spain a more likely target in any future conflict with the Soviet Union. Moreover, opponents of NATO membership pointed out that NATO would be of no assistance in an area of primary concern to Spain: the two Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, which are located in Morocco and which are outside the geographic zone of application of the North Atlantic Treaty. They also maintained that NATO would be of no benefit to Spain in the country's long-standing effort to recover Gibraltar, because it could be assumed that other NATO members would support Britain on this issue (see Gibraltar, Ceuta, and Melilla, this ch.). Resentment of the United States as the principal supporter of the Franco regime was another factor influencing those who opposed Spain's entry into NATO.

Although Suárez had announced Spain's intention of applying for NATO membership, his Union of the Democratic Center (Unión de Centro Democrático—UCD) government remained somewhat divided over the question. After Suárez resigned in 1981, his successor, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, gave high priority to this issue, arguing that Spain's entry into NATO would expedite negotiations for integration into the EC. In December 1981, the Cortes approved membership in NATO by majority vote, over the vigorous opposition of a large leftist minority. Spain officially joined NATO in May 1982.

Leaders on the left protested bitterly that NATO membership had been pushed through parliament in violation of the consensus that had been the basis of all major political decisions since 1977. The Socialists organized a protest campaign, and the PSOE leader, González, made the NATO issue a major feature of his electoral platform in 1982, promising a popular referendum on withdrawal from NATO in the event of a Socialist victory.

No immediate steps were taken to fulfill this promise, following the overwhelming Socialist victory in October 1982, although the PSOE confirmed in June 1983 that it would campaign in favor of withdrawal when the referendum was held. Many Socialists took part in a large anti-NATO demonstration organized by the PCE in June 1984, but González was having second thoughts, and he found reasons to delay the referendum. Although neutralist opinion remained strong in Spain, the government evolved toward a position favoring continued membership in NATO, which it perceived as the principal guarantor of European security. A significant factor in this change of position was the fear that withdrawal from NATO might become an insuperable obstacle to entry into the EC.

When the referendum eventually was set for March 2, 1986, González engaged in a vigorous campaign for continued, but limited,

NATO membership. The government presented NATO membership as a corollary to EC membership, and it warned of the serious economic consequences of a vote to withdraw. In spite of opinion polls indicating the probability of a negative outcome, the government secured a clear margin of victory for its position. With almost 60 percent of the electorate participating, 52.6 percent of the voters supported Spain's continued membership in NATO, while 39.8 percent opposed it. Spain remained the sixteenth member of NATO (see Participation in NATO, ch. 5).

The following year, in a move seen as emphasizing the European aspect of the defense system, González made a bid for Spanish membership in the Western European Union (WEU), a seven-nation European defense grouping, originally formed in 1948, that experienced revitalization in the 1980s. On April 19, 1988, Spain and Portugal were formally invited to join the organization.

### **Spain and the United States**

The anti-American sentiment that figured significantly in Spain's relations with NATO had its roots in the historical rivalry between the two countries for control of the territories of the New World. The Spanish-American War ended this rivalry, stripping Spain of its remaining colonies and leaving a residue of bitterness toward the United States.

In the years following the Spanish-American War, economic issues dominated relations between Spain and the United States, as Spain sought to enhance its trading position by developing closer commercial ties with the United States as well as with Latin America. A series of trade agreements signed between Spain and the United States in 1902, 1906, and 1910 led to an increased exchange of manufactured goods and agricultural products that benefited Spain's domestic economy. Cultural contacts and tourism also increased.

The emotions of the American public were stirred profoundly by the outbreak of the Civil War in Spain, and approximately 3,000 United States citizens volunteered to serve in the Spanish Republican Army, although the United States government remained adamantly neutral. Following the Nationalist victory, much of public opinion in the United States condemned Franco's regime as a fascist dictatorship, but the United States government participated in various Allied agreements with Spain, aimed at ensuring that Franco would not permit the Iberian Peninsula to be used by Adolf Hitler against Allied forces (see Foreign Policy under Franco, ch. 1).

The 1953 Pact of Madrid between Spain and the United States provided for mutual defense as well as for United States military

aid, and it brought to an end Spain's postwar isolation. It did not end anti-Americanism in Spain, however. Francoist leaders resented having to accept what they considered to be insufficient military supplies in return for basing rights. They also chafed at United States restrictions against the use of American equipment in defending Spain's North African territories in 1957. This anti-American sentiment was bipartisan in Spain. Whereas Francoists resented the United States for its democratic form of government, the opposition parties in Spain perceived the United States as the primary supporter of the Franco regime and therefore as a major obstacle to the democratization of Spain.

Following the death of Franco in 1975, the United States welcomed the liberalization of the Spanish regime under King Juan Carlos and sought to bring Spain further into Western military arrangements. In 1976 the bilateral agreement between Spain and the United States was transformed into a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. In addition to renewing United States basing rights in return for United States military and economic aid, this treaty provided for a United States-Spanish Council intended to serve as a bridge to eventual Spanish membership in NATO.

During the early years of democratic rule, the government's focus was on consolidating the parliamentary system, and foreign policy issues received less attention. However, a point of contention persisted between the governing UCD and the Socialist opposition over Spain's relations with NATO and with the United States (see Spain and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, this ch.).

When Calvo Sotelo replaced Suárez as prime minister in 1981, he made vigorous efforts to gain approval for Spanish membership in NATO, and shortly after this was accomplished a new executive agreement on the use of bases in Spain was signed with the United States in July 1982. This agreement was one of a series of renewals of the basic 1953 arrangement, providing for United States use of strategic naval and air bases on Spanish soil in exchange for United States military and economic assistance (see Military Cooperation with the United States, ch. 5).

Many Spaniards resented the presence of these bases in Spain, recalling the widely publicized photograph of United States president Dwight D. Eisenhower, throwing his arms around Franco when the first agreement on bases was signed. There were occasional popular protests against these reminders of United States support for the dictatorship, including a demonstration during United States president Ronald Reagan's 1985 visit to Spain.

The Socialists had consistently advocated a more neutralist, independent stance for Spain, and when they came to power in

October 1982, González pledged a close examination of the defense and cooperation agreements with the United States. A reduction in the United States military presence in Spain was one of the stipulations contained in the referendum, held in 1986, on continued NATO membership. In keeping with this, the prime minister announced in December 1987 that the United States would have to remove its seventy-two F-16 fighter-bombers from Spanish bases by mid-1991. Spain also had informed the United States in November that the bilateral defense agreement, which opinion polls indicated was rejected overwhelmingly by the Spanish population, would not be renewed. Nevertheless, in January 1988 Spain and the United States did reach agreement in principle on a new base agreement to last eight years. The new military arrangements called for a marked reduction of the United States presence in Spain and terminated the United States military and economic aid that had been tied to the defense treaty.

### **Spain and Latin America**

One of Spain's major foreign policy objectives since the advent of democracy has been to increase its influence in Latin America. Spain has a special interest in this area because of historical ties and a common linguistic, cultural, and religious heritage. In the post-Franco years, economic investments and diplomatic initiatives were added to the more nostalgic links between Spain and its former colonies.

Relations between Spain and Latin America have undergone profound transformation since Spain's imperial days. Resentment of Spain as the imperial power continued long after the colonial period, because many Latin Americans blamed Spain for their lack of progress and for their problems with democratization. In the early years of independence, the attitude of most Latin Americans was one of disdain for Spain. This changed, following the Spanish-American War in 1898. The devastating defeat inflicted upon Spain by the United States combined with increased United States interference in Latin America led the two Hispanic areas to draw closer together in the face of a common enemy. Both Spain and Latin America began to re-emphasize their common ties of culture, language, and religion, although trade, diplomatic, and political relations between the two areas remained minimal.

During the 1950s, modernized methods of communications and transportation facilitated closer contacts between Spain and Latin America. Trade increased, and Spain's rapid economic growth in the 1960s and the 1970s enabled the country to approach its relations with Latin America from a position of greater economic

strength. A paradoxical foreign policy phenomenon during this period was the refusal of the fiercely anticommunist Franco to break off relations with Fidel Castro Ruz's Marxist Cuba. In this instance, historical ties appeared to take precedence over ideology.

After Franco's death, Spain's transition to a democratic form of government was paralleled by the establishment of various forms of democratic rule in some Latin American countries. The timing of these governmental changes was largely coincidental, although Spain offered its transition process as an example for Latin America to follow.

The democratization process in Spain caused a reorientation of Spanish foreign policy. Under Suárez, Spain pursued a more aggressive foreign policy, which included giving increased attention to Latin America. Both Suárez and King Juan Carlos made official visits to most of the Latin American countries, and Spanish investment in the area increased markedly. When war broke out between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) in the spring of 1982, Spain supported Argentina's claim to the islands, even though the Spanish government opposed the military junta that ruled Argentina at the time.

When the Socialists came to power in 1982, Foreign Minister Fernando Morán asserted that the amount of influence Spain could exert in Europe and on the United States would depend on Spain's maintaining special relationships outside these areas, particularly with Latin America. In keeping with this policy, the Socialist government created a special assistance program for Latin America that had a budget of tens of millions of dollars in 1985.

A particular area of concern for González was the intensifying conflict in Central America. Under his leadership, Spain took an active part in the Contadora Group, an association of Latin American republics seeking peaceful solutions to the bloody struggles in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.

Before becoming prime minister, González had been involved in the articulation of the Socialist International's policies toward Latin America and had served as the president of that organization's committee for the support of the Nicaraguan Revolution, which was formed in 1980. Although González was sympathetic to the early goals of the Sandinistas, who had seized power in 1979, he later became highly critical of their radical Marxist policies. He favored the more pragmatic approach of Latin America's social democrats.

It became increasingly apparent that the prime minister's moderate views were in marked contrast to the Marxist orientation of his foreign minister. González was also less stridently anti-American

than Morán. Although critical of United States actions in both Nicaragua and El Salvador, the prime minister recognized that the United States had legitimate interests in the area and that it could not be excluded from the negotiating process. These increasingly divergent views between González and his foreign minister led to the latter's removal in the summer of 1985.

Morán's successor, Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, followed a more restrained approach—calling for Spain to be the Iberian-American conscience of Europe—in furthering Spain's active role in Latin America. Spain continued to support efforts for a peaceful resolution to the strife in Central America. In January 1988, Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega requested that Spain take part in the verification of the peace process in Central America. González accepted the proposal, provided that the other Central American governments were in agreement and that a cease-fire were in effect. The prime minister reiterated his support of the Contadora Group and emphasized that the countries involved had the ultimate responsibility for finding a solution to the conflict. He also called for an end to United States aid for the armed forces fighting against the Sandinista government (Contras) so that the peace plan could be implemented.

Although Spain had again become a significant presence in Latin America in the 1980s, there was no indication that it was on the way to supplanting the United States in the region, or, indeed, that it wanted to assume that role. At the same time, a vital sense of Hispanic commonality between Spain and Latin America appeared likely to continue.

### **Gibraltar, Ceuta, and Melilla**

The return of Gibraltar to Spain has remained a foreign policy goal for all Spanish rulers since the area was lost to Britain under the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 (see War of the Spanish Succession; Foreign Policy under Franco, ch. 1). Franco's fierce determination to regain Gibraltar culminated in his closing the frontier between Spain and Gibraltar in 1969. Governments that came to power after the regime was democratized engaged in calmer but equally persistent negotiations with the British and with the residents of Gibraltar over the future of the area. These discussions ultimately resulted in the April 1980 Lisbon Agreement, which was more symbolic than substantive, but which served as a framework for subsequent Anglo-Spanish negotiations.

The Spanish government had intended to reopen the frontier between Spain and Gibraltar shortly after the signing of the Lisbon Agreement, but it postponed this step in anger at a series of British

actions, including the use of Gibraltar as a military depot and refueling base during the Falklands War in 1982. The frontier was finally reopened in the early days of the Socialist government that was elected later in the year.

Spain's entry into NATO added new complications to the Gibraltar question, including Spain's insistence that Gibraltar was a NATO naval base as well as a British one, a contention that the British government denied. The Spanish navy refused to participate in joint military exercises with the British while Britain maintained a military base on Gibraltar. At the same time, Spanish membership in NATO provided a vehicle for negotiations on the Gibraltar question in a less competitive atmosphere. It also put Spain in a better bargaining position.

The ultimate issue underlying the various twists and turns of the Gibraltar problem was sovereignty. The approximately 30,000 residents of Gibraltar remained adamantly opposed to becoming Spanish citizens, although the UN continued to pass resolutions condemning British rule in Gibraltar as a colonial situation. As a more flexible and democratic government took root in Spain, however, and as the country achieved greater integration into Europe through its EC and NATO memberships, the possibility of a resolution of the sovereignty issue became less remote. The Socialist government, unlike its predecessors, emphasized that any solution to this problem must be in keeping with the interests of Gibraltar's inhabitants. This led observers to conjecture that—through some type of regional autonomy structure, provided for in the 1978 Constitution—a long-term plan for a form of autonomous government for Gibraltar acceptable to all concerned, might be possible.

In much the same way that Spain laid claim to Gibraltar as part of its territory, Morocco maintained that the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla were integral parts of Morocco's sovereign territory. The two North African towns and their tiny offshore islands, the last vestiges of Spain's far-flung empire, had belonged to the Spanish crown for centuries. Both were administered as integral parts of Spain and had predominantly Spanish populations; Spain insisted that they remain Spanish.

Ceuta, which had become a Spanish possession following the union with Portugal in 1580, was historically a focal point for trade between Europe and Africa. Located only thirty kilometers from metropolitan Spain, it could reasonably be regarded as a natural prolongation of the Iberian Peninsula. Although Ceuta was used for military purposes, it also functioned as a fishing port, and it had close economic links with Andalusia.



*View of Ceuta*  
*Courtesy National Tourist Office of Spain*

There were almost no direct links between Ceuta and the other Spanish enclave of Melilla, which had come under Spanish rule in the late fifteenth century. Melilla was situated more than 500 kilometers away from the Iberian Peninsula, and it did not benefit from the lively tourist traffic that Ceuta enjoyed. Because of its geographical location, Melilla also was subject to greater influence from its Moroccan hinterland than was Ceuta. In addition, more Moroccans actually lived in Melilla than in Ceuta, where the atmosphere was far more European.

There were protests on the part of the Muslim communities in both enclaves over the passage, in July 1985, of an aliens law, which required all foreigners in Spain to register with the authorities or be expelled. Tensions were especially high in Melilla, where less than one-third of the Muslim community held Spanish nationality. Promises from Madrid to assist in integrating the Muslims of both enclaves into Spanish society angered portions of the local Spanish communities, who in turn demonstrated in support of the aliens law.

The outlook for continued Spanish sovereignty in the two enclaves appeared uncertain. When Spain joined the EC in 1986, Ceuta and Melilla were considered Spanish cities and European territory. They joined the EC as part of Spain, and they hoped to receive financial assistance from the EC's Regional Development Fund.



Spain also hoped that membership in NATO, while providing no security guarantee to Ceuta and Melilla, might make Morocco's King Hassan II less likely to move against territory belonging to a NATO member; however, Spanish demands for the return of Gibraltar could fuel Moroccan claims to the North African enclaves.

Mounting tensions between the Spanish and the Muslim populations in Ceuta and in Melilla added to the precariousness of the Spanish position. In addition, a few leaders in both the socialist and the communist parties expressed sympathy for Morocco's claim, contributing to a growing fear of abandonment on the part of the enclaves' inhabitants. A resolution of this tenuous situation did not appear imminent in mid-1988.

### **Spain and the Middle East**

In spite of tensions with Morocco over control of Ceuta and Melilla, Spain continued to consider itself as a bridge between the Arab world and Western Europe. In an effort to maintain good relations with Islamic states, the Spanish government adopted a pro-Arab stance in most Middle East conflicts. For years, Spain was the only West European country that did not recognize Israel. The Spanish government finally established diplomatic relations with the Israeli state in January 1986. When that step resulted in widespread criticism from the Arab states, Spain hastened to compensate by according diplomatic status to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) mission in Madrid in August 1986. More generalized efforts to increase Spain's role throughout the Middle East and Africa in the 1980s included expanded trade and cultural relations.

### **Spain and the Soviet Union**

Diplomatic relations between Spain and the Soviet Union were not formally reestablished until February 1977, although there had been extensive trade and cultural contacts between the two nations for decades, and Spain had already established diplomatic relations with the other Warsaw Pact states. This long delay was due in part to Franco's strong anticommunist feelings, but more particularly to his bitterness toward the Soviet Union for its support of the Republican forces during the Spanish Civil War. Anti-Soviet sentiment was not limited to the Francoists in the years following that devastating upheaval. Because of the attempts of the Soviet dictator, Joseph Stalin, to destroy leftist elements within Spain that were independent of Moscow, anti-Francoists as well as Franco's supporters were deeply distrustful of Moscow (see *The Spanish Civil War*, ch. 1).

Spain's relations with the Soviet Union were also significantly affected by its relations with the United States. From the point of view of the Soviet Union, it was vital to maintain a strong position in the Mediterranean in order to guard the gateway to the Black Sea and to assure access to the Atlantic Ocean through the Strait of Gibraltar. At the same time, the United States, wary of Soviet expansionist aims, had sought to protect this vital region by the establishment of United States bases on Spanish soil. The opposition that subsequently developed within Spain to the continued presence of United States forces there received encouragement from the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, when Moscow delivered a warning to Madrid, referring to the "negative consequences" that could ensue if Spain joined NATO, Spain's foreign minister curtly remonstrated with the Soviet Union for attempting to interfere in Spain's internal affairs.

Spanish public opinion has generally not shared United States fears of a serious Soviet military threat. Spaniards have favored increasing trade with the Soviet Union, and they have welcomed Moscow's support of Spain's demand for the "decolonization" of Gibraltar. In the late 1970s and the 1980s, however, Spain moved toward an increasingly independent stance, and this applied to its relations with the Soviet Union as well as with the United States. Such independence also was reflected in the efforts of the PCE to reduce its ties to Moscow (see Political Parties, this ch.). In the mid-1980s, Spain's major difficulty with regard to the Soviet Union concerned the extensive espionage activities that had been mounted from the large Soviet embassy installed after Franco's death and that had led to the expulsion of several Soviet diplomats.

### **Spain and France**

While the Soviet Union appeared to most Spaniards to be too far away to pose any immediate threat, Spain's most difficult relations in the postwar years were with its European neighbor to the north, France. Spain's relations with France had been troublesome since 1945, when France called for an Allied invasion of Spain to remove the last fascist dictator. When the United States and Britain refused to agree to such a course of action, France permitted anti-Franco forces to use France as a base for organizing raids into Spain. When some of these infiltrators were apprehended and executed in Spain in 1946, the Allies declared that Spain would be forbidden to join the UN while under the control of Franco. France was also the major obstacle to Spain's entry into the EC. Responding to the pressures of a strong agricultural lobby, the French government

succeeded in delaying Spanish membership in the EC (see Spain and the European Community, this ch.).

French policies also exacerbated Spain's most volatile domestic political problem, that of Basque terrorism. For years, France maintained a policy of providing sanctuary to terrorists, who were seen as "resistance fighters." This policy became less tenable, however, after the democratization of Spain. Following the appearance of terrorist activity within France itself, the policy of sanctuary was markedly restricted, and by 1986 France was cooperating with Spain in efforts to combat terrorist activity (see Threats to Internal Security, ch. 5).

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Two highly readable works dealing with political and social developments in the new democratic Spain are John Hooper's *The Spaniards: A Portrait of the New Spain* and Robert Graham's *Spain: A Nation Comes of Age*. A selection of papers delivered at a conference conducted by the West European Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars deals with the dominant issues facing Spain as the country consolidates its democratic system. Titled *Spain in the 1980s* (edited by Robert P. Clark and Michael H. Haltzel), it includes insightful articles by leading Spanish political figures as well as papers prepared by American and British experts on Spain.

A thorough and lucidly written examination of the provisions contained in the Spanish Constitution can be found in the *Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly* in an article by George E. Glos. Updates and elaborations of laws pertaining to the Spanish governmental system are available in *Spain: A Guide to Political and Economic Institutions*, by Peter J. Donaghy and Michael T. Newton. This book provides the most comprehensive treatment of Spain's major political and economic institutions and the first in-depth study of local and regional institutions to be published in English.

The rapid evolution of Spanish politics after Franco is depicted in *Democratic Politics in Spain*, edited by David S. Bell. Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad provide a comprehensive description of the development of political parties and the political orientations of the electorate in *Spain After Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System*. How these parties fared is the topic of the insightful *Spain at the Polls, 1977, 1979, and 1982: A Study of the National Elections*, edited by Howard R. Penniman and Eusebio M. Mujal-León. Group political participation, as manifested in the interest groups that influenced Spain's political development,

is emphasized in *Politics and Change in Spain*, edited by Thomas D. Lancaster and Gary Prevost.

An excellent background for the study of Spanish foreign relations may be found in James W. Cortada's *Spain in the Twentieth-Century World*. Although somewhat dated, it covers the major thrust of Spain's foreign policy both before and after Franco. *Spain: Studies in Political Security*, edited by Joyce Lasky Shub and Raymond Carr, also provides a useful analysis of Spain's foreign policy goals. For a study of Spain's relations with the Latin American countries, see Howard J. Wiarda's *The Iberian-Latin American Connection: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy*. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)



## Chapter 5. National Security



*Spanish soldiers*

DURING THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY, when Spain was the most powerful nation in Europe, the Spanish armed forces enjoyed a formidable reputation. The military decline that set in during the Thirty Years' War (1618–48) brought an end to Spain's ascendancy. During the nineteenth century, the ineffectiveness of the Spanish armed forces was demonstrated repeatedly by humiliating defeats abroad. A decadent monarchy and the weak and corrupt civil governments of the time cemented the military's involvement in domestic politics; interventions by an inflated and underemployed officer corps became a recurrent feature of Spanish political life.

At the conclusion of the 1936–39 Civil War, the victorious Nationalist army of General Francisco Franco y Bahamonde (dictator of Spain, 1939–75) was a large and hardened fighting force. Franco maintained direct command over the army, which he employed as an instrument for suppressing opposition to his regime. The country, however, exhausted economically after the Civil War, could not afford a large military establishment. Its size was steadily reduced, and it lacked the means to fight a modern conflict. Beginning in 1953, military assistance furnished by the United States in conjunction with the base agreement between the two countries helped to reverse the deterioration of the armed forces.

The constitutional monarchy that emerged on Franco's death in 1975 was threatened by the rebelliousness of many senior officers who had failed to come to terms with the new democratic climate. Nevertheless, under the 1978 Constitution and subsequent enactments, the mission and the structure of the armed forces were gradually transformed. Funds were allotted for new equipment and for improved training. The career system was rationalized, and pay increases were granted. The three individual service ministries were replaced by a single Ministry of Defense with a civilian at its head. The Chief of the Defense Staff (Jefe del Estado Mayor de la Defensa—JEMAD), the highest military officer, acted in a supportive role to the minister of defense in carrying out military policies.

Further reforms were introduced by the Socialist government of Felipe González Márquez, who came to power in 1982. The army was reconstituted as five divisions comprising eleven brigades, plus four independent brigades. The distinction between forces, earmarked to protect against external threats, and regional defense



units, organized to maintain internal order, was abandoned. From a manpower strength of 280,000, when the Socialists took office, the army was scheduled to be reduced by nearly one-third to 195,000 effectives by 1991.

The navy and the air force, less burdened by personnel costs, were farther along in their modernization programs than the army. In 1987 the navy had a personnel strength of about 47,300, including 11,500 marines; its fleet of warships in 1988 included a new aircraft carrier. The air force, with a manpower level of 33,000, had an aging inventory of 18 squadrons of interceptor and ground attack aircraft. More advanced F-18 Hornets, seventy-two of them purchased from the United States, were scheduled for delivery in the 1986 to 1990 period.

Spain's long-established policy of neutrality ended with its conditional accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1982. Spain's membership, subject to conditions that circumscribed the Spanish role, remained in doubt, however, until it was ratified by a public referendum in 1986. Spain abstained from participating in the NATO integrated command structure, continued to ban nuclear weapons from Spanish soil, and excluded the use of Spanish forces outside its own territory. The Spanish government also insisted on the removal of a wing of United States fighter planes based near Madrid, which had formed a part of NATO's South European defenses.

In spite of the modernization program, the Spanish armed forces, especially the army, were still deficient in relation to other NATO nations. Defense spending remained well below the average for the alliance. Nevertheless, Spain was potentially capable of making a significant contribution to NATO's defenses. Moreover, its accession to the treaty was expected to invigorate the Spanish military establishment and to contribute to its emergence as a modern force with a well-defined mission as part of Europe's collective security.

## **The Military in National Life**

Since the early nineteenth century, the Spanish armed forces had been burdened by an inflated officer corps and had had infrequent military challenges. The professional military was preoccupied with its status and its privileges. Promotions were slow, and they were based on seniority rather than on merit. Fighting units were starved of modern equipment because of heavy personnel costs. The military had established a tradition of frequent interventions to alter the course of internal politics in what it perceived to be the higher interests of the nation. Nevertheless, until the authoritarian regime of Miguel Primo de Rivera (1923-30), the military was more

inclined to induce changes in civilian governments than it was to impose direct rule (see *The African War and the Authoritarian Regime of Miguel Primo de Rivera*, ch. 1).

Although left with a large and powerful army at the close of the Civil War in 1939, Franco allowed the armed forces to deteriorate. The majority of his officers were identified with the most reactionary elements in the government and with the repressive aspects of the regime. They were thrust into an uneasy relationship with the civilian politicians of the democratic government installed after Franco's death in 1975. Aggrieved over the course of events, a small group of army and Civil Guard (*Guardia Civil*) officers attempted a coup on February 23, 1981, by holding the entire government hostage in the Cortes (Spanish Parliament). The coup failed because of the lack of support and the intervention of the king on the side of democratic rule (see *Disenchantment with UCD Leadership*, ch. 1).

The Socialist government that assumed office in 1982 introduced a radical program to reform the status of the armed forces. It set out to improve the material conditions of military life, but it also imposed layers of civilian control and a sharp cutback in the size of the army and the number of active-duty officers. Smaller, but more rationally configured and embarked on a modernization program, the armed forces were faced with the task of coordinating Spain's fighting strength with the overall NATO defense effort. Although the officer corps continued to be treated cautiously as a potentially intrusive factor if the civilian government faltered, its traditional political role seemed increasingly anachronistic.

### **Historical Role of the Armed Forces**

Permanently organized armed forces were first created during the reign of Ferdinand of Aragon (Spanish, *Aragón*) and Isabella of Castile (Spanish, *Castilla*) in the fifteenth century (see *Ferdinand and Isabella*, ch. 1). Throughout the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, the army was well organized and disciplined, employing the most technologically advanced weapons of all the forces in Europe; in that period it suffered no decisive defeat. The army was colorful, feared, and respected. Military careers had status, and they were sought by the aristocracy and by the most ambitious of the commoners.

The navy was also formidable throughout much of the same period. The humiliation of the Armada, as the navy is known in Spain, in its battle against England in 1588 was a result of inadequate strategy and tactics, complicated by weather, not inferior fleet size. Its defeat did not end Spain's days as a sea power, but

Spain was never again mistress of the seas. The appeal of military careers gradually declined, and the lower ranks became a haven for social misfits. Foreign mercenaries outnumbered Spaniards in twenty-six of the thirty-one brigades formed during the reign of Philip III (1598–1621). The Thirty Years' War began the eclipse of Spain's international prestige as a military power. The occupation of Spain by Napoleon Bonaparte in the first decade of the nineteenth century was the last occasion on which Spanish forces participated in a major conflict with those of other European powers (see *The Napoleonic Era*, ch. 1).

The War of Independence (1808–14) marked the armed forces' departure from unquestioning obedience to the government. Although the government had acquiesced in the French occupation, and many of the army's leaders had concurred in this, a number of regular army units rebelled against the occupation and responded to the patriotic cause. After the defeat by the French, guerrilla units continued to resist. Composed largely of former army personnel, these units were, in effect, fighting a people's war in opposition to the so-called legal government.

When the War of Independence ended, officers from the old army were joined by those of the resistance groups. Most retained their military status rather than resign or retire, because there were few employment opportunities in the sluggish civilian economy of the time. The glut of officers persisted, and it was one of the factors contributing to the military's continued dabbling in the political arena.

The Carlist civil wars that occurred intermittently between 1833 and 1876, the decadent monarchy, and the weak governments of the nineteenth century cemented the military's involvement in politics (see *Rule by Pronunciamiento*; *Liberal Rule*, ch. 1). Civilian politicians were rarely willing to turn over power, but they often encouraged actions by the military when conditions under the group in control could no longer be tolerated. Although not all its members shared a common ideology, the military was generally among the more liberal forces in society.

The armed forces were either the instigators of, or the major participants in, most of the governmental changes between 1814 and the Civil War of the 1930s. There were so many military interventions that the procedure followed a stylized scenario, known as the *pronunciamiento* (pl., *pronunciamientos*). A group of officers—usually led by a general—would, after exploring the “will of the people,” seek a commitment to rebellion from other officers, who would pledge their troops and agree to act upon a proper signal. Convinced of adequate support, the leader would then issue a

*pronunciamiento*, which typically would consist of an address to the troops or to a street gathering, taking the form of direct or oblique threats against the government. Both the military leaders and the government would then watch the public reaction to determine whether there had been an impressive rallying to the rebel cause, in which case the government would resign. If the *pronunciamiento* were not greeted with revolutionary enthusiasm and if those who had agreed to stage simultaneous demonstrations failed to do so, the effort was quickly abandoned.

*Pronunciamientos* were made almost annually between 1814 and 1868, and occasionally thereafter until the 1930s. The last successful one brought Primo de Rivera to power in 1923.

Despite the position of the armed forces as a highly important factor in Spanish politics, they demonstrated deplorable incompetence in battle. Spain's Latin American colonies successfully broke away early in the nineteenth century. Spain's last colonies, Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines, were lost during the Spanish-American War of 1898. The navy shared the army's disgrace; its crushing losses during the Spanish-American War left it with only two major combat vessels. Spain emerged successfully from a frustrating campaign against Morocco (1907-27) only after painful and humiliating defeats. Symptomatic of the defense establishment's failure to adapt to modern needs was the existence of nearly 150 admirals in the navy of the time.

## **The Civil War and Its Aftermath**

After the Spanish Civil War broke out in 1936, a majority of the officers remained to fight in the Republican forces, as much from a sense of obligation to the legitimate government as on ideological grounds. Their units usually stayed intact and followed them. Many remained with the forces controlling the areas in which they found themselves. More conservative officers tended to join the Nationalist forces of the rebellion.

The Republican forces controlled the larger share of the land, including the cities of Madrid and Barcelona, at the beginning of the war. Their troops often fought superbly; however, their leaders were less effective than those of the Nationalist army, which also had the better disciplined of the army's fighting units (those that were based in Morocco) and better organized international support, primarily from Germany and Italy. Moreover, in Franco they had by far the most gifted combat leader (see *The Spanish Civil War*, ch. 1).

At the outset of the war, the Nationalists controlled most of the highlands of the north, much of the western part of the country,

and a part of Andalusia (Spanish, Andalucía) in the south (see fig. 4). The Republicans controlled the northern coast and most of the country east of Madrid, including all of Catalonia (Spanish, Cataluña; Catalan, Catalunya). It became apparent that the war was to be a long struggle, when Franco's forces from Andalusia advanced to the Madrid area in the early months of the war but failed to take the city.

In subsequent campaigns, the Nationalist forces expanded the areas they held to include most of the northern, the southern, and the western portions of the country. During the last year, they drove a wedge between the Republican forces in Madrid and Catalonia, decisively defeated those in Catalonia, and seized Barcelona. Forces in Madrid could no longer be supplied. The city and the Republican cause were surrendered in March 1939.

Franco's victorious troops had by then been molded into a powerful and well-equipped army, organized into sixty-one divisions. Its strength compared favorably with other European armies on the eve of World War II. The country's energies, however, were spent. It soon became apparent that a force of that size was not needed to maintain order and that it could not be supported under the prevailing economic conditions. By 1941 demobilization had brought the army down to twenty-four divisions in peninsular Spain. Its offensive capability was already depleted; with only one motorized division, it was rapidly becoming out of date.

Franco avoided being drawn into World War II, although a volunteer Spanish unit known as the Blue Division served with German forces on the Soviet front between August 1941 and October 1943. Fully outfitted and financed by Germany, it fought almost entirely in the Leningrad sector. The 40,000 volunteers who served in the Blue Division swore allegiance to the German dictator, Adolf Hitler, rather than to Franco or to Spain (see Foreign Policy under Franco, ch. 1).

Although the economy had recovered to pre-Civil War levels by 1951, the army was ill-trained and poorly equipped, lacking modern armaments and transport. Substantial United States assistance after the signing of the Pact of Madrid in 1953 helped to reverse the deterioration and contributed to a slow improvement in quality. World War II-vintage tanks and artillery were introduced into the army, new and refurbished ships were supplied to the navy, and the air force was equipped with modern jet aircraft (see Military Cooperation with the United States, this ch.).

An important reorganization of the army in 1965 grouped it into two distinct categories: an intervention force organized to protect against external threats, and a territorial defense army divided into

nine regional garrisons. Both forces were deployed in such a way that they were available to protect against internal disorder rather than to defend the country's borders. The strongest units of the intervention force were concentrated around Madrid, in the center of the country; others were assigned to the nine military regions under captains general into which the country was divided, in such a manner as to maximize security against regional dissidents.

### **The Military in Political Life**

The armed forces have constituted a highly important and often decisive factor in Spanish politics throughout the modern history of the country as a constitutional monarchy and republic. During most of the nineteenth century, the military was considered to be a liberal influence, intervening to enforce necessary correctives against the failings of weak civilian governments, but not seeking to replace civilian institutions permanently. After about 1875, the army was less involved politically, and it often found itself on the side of maintaining public order against popular movements of peasants and the industrial working class. Although their outlook was little changed, the officers then occupied what had become the right side of the political spectrum in a period of rapidly evolving political ideas.

Until the Spanish Civil War, the range of acceptable political beliefs among army officers remained quite broad. One result of the conflict was that the most conservative officers tended to join the Nationalist forces. More than 10,000 Nationalist officers who had survived the war, or who had been commissioned during its course, decided to stay on as regulars. The officer corps was completely purged of those who had fought on the losing side. The army leadership during the next three decades thus was drawn from the group that had been the most conservative and the most closely identified with Franco's political ideology.

High-ranking soldiers were appointed by Franco to important state bodies and served in the Cortes. (Under the 1978 Constitution, officers are required to resign their commissions to run for parliamentary office.) Over one-third of the ministers in post-1939 cabinets had backgrounds as career officers. The ministers of the army, the navy, and the air force were invariably professional military, as was the minister of interior, who was responsible for internal security. Many officers also served in civilian ministries and in other agencies, in companies owned by the government, and on the boards of directors of leading private companies. Nevertheless, as modernization of the economy proceeded, the main functions of government fell increasingly under the control of civilian

technocrats. The influence of the military in the final stages of the Franco regime was limited primarily to the prime minister and to the armed forces ministerial portfolios. In spite of its prominent representation in the ministries and in the industries connected with defense, the military establishment had little success in persuading Franco to earmark for it the resources needed to overcome the obsolescence of the armed forces.

The more senior officers remained extremely conservative, violently opposed to the left, and suspicious of any broadening of political expression. Certain military reforms were advanced by Diego Alegría, the army commander who took office in 1970. He aimed at more selective enlistments, at rationalization of troop deployments, and at promotion by merit rather than by seniority. Alegría's program was undermined, however, by right-wing commanders, who secured his removal in 1974.

In 1972 a secret society of younger army officers, the Democratic Military Union (Unión Militar Democrática—UMD) grew quickly, numbering 300 in 1975 when many of its members were arrested and court-martialed. Most of the reforms they proposed—the unification of the three service ministries, a restriction in the scope of the military justice system, reductions in the length of obligatory military service, curbs on the military intelligence system, and a less prominent role for the captains general of the nine military regions—were adopted after Franco's death.

During the transition period after Franco's death, the civil government adopted a deferential attitude toward the military leadership, which, as the national institution most loyal to the former regime and most able to intervene decisively, presented the greatest danger to the program of the new democratic leaders. The civilian authorities prudently consulted the military before adopting new proposals, seeking their implied consent. Many members of the officer corps willingly accepted the new constitutional order, but others—mainly in the army—who still identified with the Franco era, regarded it as a betrayal of the Civil War victory in 1939.

In spite of objections by the most vocal elements, the senior military acquiesced in the important changes to the military command structure needed to bring it unambiguously under civilian direction (see Jurisdiction over National Defense, this ch.). The military was dangerously antagonized by other actions, however, particularly by the legalization of the Communist Party of Spain (Partido Comunista de España—PCE) in 1977 after the military had received what it had interpreted as a firm pledge against such a step.

The accumulating discontent of certain officers was made evident by a number of provocative incidents. The first of a series of plots against the government was uncovered in November 1978. The extremely light sentences imposed on the officers involved may have encouraged conspiracies. In late 1980 and early 1981, at least three further schemes appeared to be afoot. The conspiracy that came closest to success was the invasion of the Congress of Deputies (lower house of the Cortes) on February 23, 1981, by Civil Guardsmen and soldiers who took as hostages the entire body as well as the cabinet, which was present for a debate on a new government. The three principal plotters were Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero Molina, an officer of the Civil Guard; Lieutenant General Jaime Milans del Bosch, captain general of Valencia; and Lieutenant General Alfonso Armada Comyn, a confidant of the king. Milans del Bosch had previously been commander of the elite Brunete Armored Division near Madrid, but he had been transferred, as a result of his well-known antipathy to the new political order, under suspicion of earlier plotting. Armada had been forced from a post in the royal household because of his political activities. The failure of other units to join the mutineers, the vacillation of a number of officers who had been counted on to join the revolt, and, most particularly, the denunciation of the attempt by King Juan Carlos de Borbón, who appeared in uniform on national television, brought the release of the civilian politicians, after twenty-two hours, and the surrender of the forces under the control of the conspirators.

At least one further plot was foiled when a group of colonels was discovered planning to seize power on the eve of the October 1982 general election. The subsequent accommodation of the military to the Socialist government of González and the military's grudging acceptance of the major reforms of the armed forces, introduced in 1983, and of Spain's membership in NATO and in the European Community (EC—see Glossary) appeared to have moderated the danger of new attempts by right-wing officers to challenge civilian authority.

In spite of the government's success in establishing unequivocal authority over the principal issues of national security, certain matters continued to be sensitive for the military. Attacks by Basque terrorists on high-ranking officers and security personnel have been a source of bitterness. Government plans to devolve greater autonomy on regional governments were delayed; and, these plans were less extensive than originally foreseen, in deference to military objections to the decentralization process, especially as it applied to the Basque region. The inflexibly nationalistic stance of the military commanders was the primary factor determining government



policy regarding the status of the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on the North African coast as well as on negotiations with Britain over the status of Gibraltar (see Gibraltar, Ceuta, and Melilla, ch. 4).

By 1986 the authority of the defense minister was great enough to enable him to replace the JEMAD and the three service chiefs of staff, reportedly because they had failed to support the military reform program. Nevertheless, the military leaders continued to be treated with prudence. The government made a considerable effort to demonstrate sympathy and respect for the military in ceremonies and in official statements. The king, who had received training in the three military academies, had carefully forged links with the military. As supreme commander, he could in theory supersede the political authority of the country. His public addresses recognized the contribution of the military and were sensitive to the need to sustain its morale in the face of the fundamental changes that it had been obliged to accept. At the same time, the king stressed that, in a democracy, the armed forces must comport themselves with discipline and restraint (see Political Interest Groups, ch. 4).

### **The Military in Society**

Officers of the Spanish armed forces have tended to regard themselves as highly patriotic, self-denying, and devoted to service. They attach importance to the symbols of Spanish unity and historical continuity. Sensitive to criticism and extremely conscious of perceived slights to honor, they have constantly sought reassurance that their role was appreciated by the government and by the public.

The military careerists' sense of forming a community set at a distance from civilian society has been heightened by their style of living. They usually have been housed on military compounds; they have shopped in military outlets, have obtained free education for their children at military schools, have used military hospitals, and have taken holidays at special facilities made available only to the armed forces. This isolated life has not been entirely a matter of choice, but has been necessitated by low wage scales. Until 1978 the majority of officers could maintain themselves only by holding second jobs, after finishing their military duties at midday.

Rates of intermarriage within the armed services community have always been high, as has been the ratio of sons of military personnel choosing military careers. As of 1979, about 67 percent of those entering the army military academy were following their fathers into the service. The corresponding ratio for the navy was



*King Juan Carlos in military uniform  
Courtesy National Tourist Office of Spain*

81 percent, and for the air force it was 54 percent. The future of the officers' group, as a distinctive social class, appeared to be in jeopardy by the mid-1980s. Uncompetitive salaries, greater career opportunities in the modern civilian economy, and reduced prospects in an officer corps that was faced with dramatic staff reductions presented a discouraging prospect to the sons of officers. A newer source of entrants to the military academies was developing among the sons of noncommissioned officers (NCOs), however, for whom the free education and the potential for social advancement were important inducements.

In terms of its status as a profession, military service has traditionally ranked high, below that of doctors and of engineers, but higher than that of lawyers, of deputies of the Cortes, and of members of the priesthood. In an opinion poll taken in late 1986, concerning the prestige of nineteen of the leading institutions of the nation, the armed services ranked seventh, below that of the monarchy, the Roman Catholic Church, the press, and the internal security forces, but above the Cortes, the central government, the courts, unions, universities, and the business community.

### **External Security Perceptions and Policies**

Not having faced any serious threat to its territorial integrity for more than 150 years, Spain has tended to regard itself as safely removed from conflicts that could arise on the continent of Europe. Spain's remoteness and the physical barriers to mounting a successful attack on its soil appear to justify this view. To the north, the Cordillera Cantábrica and the Pyrenees form natural defenses against invasion (see fig. 5). Attacks from the sea, whether from the Atlantic or the Mediterranean coasts, also would confront rugged terrain. Only by invading from the west, through Portugal, could a hostile army find relatively level terrain, permitting maneuver. The distance between central Spain and the nearest Warsaw Pact airfields is nearly 2,000 kilometers. Hostile aircraft with the necessary range would need to survive NATO air defenses over Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) in order to attack Spanish targets.

Spain's success in maintaining a status of nonbelligerency in both World War I and World War II has helped to contribute to its sense of invulnerability. In spite of the strongly anticommunist and anti-Soviet attitude among the Spanish military, there has been little sense of an immediate security threat from the Soviet Union. The reinforcement of the Soviet naval squadron in the Mediterranean Sea, with an aircraft carrier in 1979, and the increased number of Soviet submarines passing through the Strait of Gibraltar

have modified this perception to some degree, however, in the late 1980s. Spanish naval planners have been obliged to take account of this new potential risk to the strait and to the Spanish Mediterranean islands and coast.

The conclusion of the 1953 Pact of Madrid with the United States altered Spain's traditional neutrality, making its territory a factor in the defense of the West. The Spanish military leadership began to recognize that Spain had acquired strategic importance as a result of the presence of United States bases and that it had become a potential target in the event of conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. If the West suffered a military setback, particularly on NATO's vulnerable southern flank, Spain's security and territorial integrity would be directly threatened.

Spain's adherence to NATO in 1982 necessitated the recasting of Spain's traditional strategic doctrine to accept the concept of collective security in partnership with other nations of the West. The public's endorsement of Spanish membership in NATO, in a 1986 referendum, demonstrated recognition that, under the conditions of modern warfare, a threat to Central Europe represented a threat to Spain as well. Nevertheless, in the debate over the advantages of Spanish membership, opponents pointed out that Spain would face a higher level of risk, including exposure to bombardment from the air and nuclear attack.

Prior to accepting NATO commitments, much of Spain's strategic planning had been dominated by the potential threat from North Africa. The immediate objects of any belligerency had been expected to be the port enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. Surrounded on the landward side by Moroccan territory and claimed by Morocco, these remnants of Spain's once-vast empire were vulnerable both economically and militarily. Both were fortified towns defended by relatively strong garrisons. Since the fifteenth century, they had formed a line of defense against the Islamic threat to the Iberian Peninsula. In modern times, however, their strategic importance was that, together with Gibraltar, they ensured that control of the strait linking the western Mediterranean with the Atlantic was in Western hands.

If it had chosen to do so, Morocco probably could have imposed a damaging economic blockade on the two cities. Observers regarded the likelihood of such an action as small, however, because of the losses that would be inflicted on people living in adjacent Moroccan areas dependent on sales of their products and on smuggling operations in the enclaves. Militarily, Morocco probably would not have been strong enough to drive the Spanish out, and it had generally avoided actions that would inflame the issue. The

success of the Spanish military in cultivating their Moroccan counterparts had also helped to keep tensions at a minimum. Nevertheless, for a time the short-lived 1984 treaty of union between Libya and Morocco created anxiety in Spain because the military potential of the two countries combined with the belligerency of the Libyan ruler, Muammar al Qadhafi, accentuated its sense of vulnerability.

A number of Spanish observers criticized the failure of the Spanish government to secure recognition from NATO of Ceuta and Melilla as falling within the geographical sphere of the treaty, thereby requiring a response from the alliance if they were attacked. Others concluded that Spain's NATO ties would, at a minimum, act as a brake against action by Morocco because Spain could avail itself of the consultative provisions of the treaty if it regarded its territorial integrity, political independence, or security as coming under threat. Realistically, however, other NATO countries viewed the enclaves as remnants of the European colonial past in Africa, and they could not be counted on for assistance.

## **Jurisdiction over National Defense**

In Francoist Spain, the head of state occupied the position of commander in chief of the armed forces. He was, in an active sense, at the top of the military hierarchy, linked directly to the three services. The ministers of the army, the air force, and the navy—customarily officers of three-star rank—directed the operations, the training, and the administration of their respective services to the extent of the authority delegated to them by Franco as commander in chief. Under Franco the National Defense Council and the Supreme Staff had planning and coordinating functions without real authority over the three services.

After Adolfo Suárez González took office in 1976, replacing Franco's last prime minister, he set into motion a series of measures to convert the command structure into one resembling that of other democratic Western nations and to place the armed forces unequivocally under the authority of the elected civilian government. The chairman of the Supreme Staff, Lieutenant General Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado, was entrusted with this task, for which he was appointed deputy prime minister responsible for defense. Gutiérrez Mellado acted vigorously to introduce a host of reforms, the first of which was to replace the chairman of the Supreme Staff by transferring his powers to a newly created Joint Chiefs of Staff (Junta de Jefes de Estado Mayor—JUJEM), comprising of the three service chiefs and a chairman. By a royal decree in June 1977, the three service ministries were replaced by a single Ministry of

Defense. Gutiérrez Mellado became the first minister of defense; when he retired two years later, a civilian assumed the portfolio.

The new ministry was given the task of preparing organizational alternatives for the government to consider in the areas of national defense and the execution of military policy. A further stage in the transition was reached with the promulgation of the new 1978 Constitution, which, in Article 8, states that:

1. "The Armed Forces, consisting of the army, the navy, and the air force, have as their mission the guarantee of the sovereignty and independence of Spain, the defense of its territorial integrity, and the constitutional order.


2. "An organic law will regulate the bases of the military organization, in conformity with the principles of the present Constitution."

Article 97 establishes that "The government directs domestic and external policy, the civil and military administration, and the defense of the state. Exercise of the executive function and jurisdiction will be by regulation in accordance with the Constitution and the laws."

The language of the new Constitution affirms that responsibility for defense and for military policy is to be under the authority of the civilian government. The new definition of the armed forces clearly distinguishes them from the forces of public order, i.e., the Civil Guard and the police, which had been treated as part of the armed forces under the applicable organic law of the previous regime. Allocation to the armed forces of the responsibility to defend the constitutional order was intended to reassert the role of the military in internal security and to underscore the illegality of actions contrary to the democratic system.

In conformity with Article 8.2 of the Constitution, Organic Law 6 was promulgated on July 1, 1980. It allocates authority in matters concerning national defense and the military establishment, declaring that the king is the supreme commander of the armed forces and the presiding officer of the National Defense Council at sessions that he attends, and that the government, headed by the prime minister, is to determine defense policy. It names the National Defense Council, to include both civilian and military officials, as the senior advisory and consultative body of the government, with the task of formulating and proposing military policy. The JUJEM would continue to serve as the senior joint military advisory board (see fig. 14).

The division of responsibilities set out in the 1980 law failed to resolve all of the issues involved in the distribution of functions; notably, it failed to assure that the planning of military requirements took full account of available resources. In addition, the



Sources: Based on information from Spain, Ministerio de Defensa, Secretaría General Técnica, *Memoria Legislativa, 1982-86*, Madrid, 1986, 47-64; and Felipe Quero Rodiles, "La Nueva Estructura del Ministerio de Defensa," *Reconquista* [Madrid], February 1987, 30-34.

Figure 14. Organization of National Defense, 1988

powers of the prime minister and the minister of defense to supervise the conduct of military operations were not clearly defined. Some politicians felt that the military still dominated the chain of command.

To deal with these problems, Organic Law 1 of January 5, 1984, introduced certain modifications. It specifically assigns to the prime minister the responsibility for defining the outlines of strategic and military policy, and it authorizes him to order, to coordinate, and to direct the implementation of military policy by the armed forces. It establishes that the minister of defense could exercise various of these functions as delegated to him by the prime minister. It modifies the role of the JUJEM, confining it to that of a military advisory body to both the prime minister and the minister of defense. An important innovation is the creation of the post of Chief of the Defense Staff (Jefe del Estado Mayor de la Defensa—JEMAD). As the highest figure in the military hierarchy, the JEMAD is instructed to act as principal collaborator to the minister of defense in the planning and the execution of the operational aspects of military policy. In wartime, the JEMAD would be commander in chief of the armed forces, directly responsible for conducting military operations.

As explained by the government, the 1984 law formalizes the procedure whereby the prime minister and the minister of defense are given a preponderant role in carrying out defense policy and in integrating the contributions of the individual branches of the armed forces. All three service chiefs of staff must exercise their commands under the authority of the civilian leaders; the law allows for no separate military command whereby the armed forces could operate autonomously.

## **Military Commands and Organization**

As a result of the organizational reforms since 1977, culminating in the 1984 law that reaffirmed civil authority over the military establishment, command responsibility for the three armed services, was vested in the JEMAD, who reported directly to the minister of defense. The post was held by a senior officer of each of the three services on an alternating basis, with no specified term. The JEMAD was responsible for proposing major strategic objectives that formed the basis for the Joint Strategic Plan, prepared by the Ministry of Defense for the prime minister's approval. The JEMAD also prepared operational directives and plans derived from the Joint Strategic Plan, determined requirements for the conduct of military operations in case of war, coordinated logistics among the three services, and supervised the training and effectiveness



of the services. To carry out these functions, the JEMAD had at his disposal a staff of five sections: plans and organization, intelligence, strategy, logistics, and telecommunications and electronic warfare.

At a senior level in the Ministry of Defense, the office of the secretary of state for defense was responsible for material and economic resources. The office was divided into three directorates general, concerned, respectively, with economic affairs, armaments and matériel, and infrastructure. At a parallel level, the under secretary of defense and his staff supervised technical services, personnel training, administrative services, and the general counsel.

The first JEMAD was Admiral Angel Liberal Lucini. In October 1986, Lucini was succeeded by Lieutenant General Gonzalo Puigserver Roma, an air force officer; the chiefs of staff of the three service branches were replaced at the same time. The wholesale removal of the top military leadership reportedly was carried out by Minister of Defense Narcís Serra i Serra in reaction to their opposition to several of the Socialist government's reform measures, including the reduction of compulsory military service to twelve months and changes in the military justice system that expanded the rights of individual soldiers (see Sources and Quality of Manpower; Military Justice, this ch.).

## **Army**

The army (*Ejército de Tierra*) has existed continuously since the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella. The oldest and largest of the three services, its mission was the defense of peninsular Spain, the Balearic Islands (Spanish, *Islas Baleares*), the Canary Islands (Spanish, *Canarias*), Melilla, Ceuta, and the smaller islands and rocks off the northern coast of Africa. The army was, as of 1988, completing a major reorganization that had been initiated in 1982. It had previously been organized into nine regional operational commands. These were reduced to six commands in conjunction with a revised deployment of forces: Central Command, Southern Command, Levante Command, Eastern Pyrenees Command, North-western Command, and Western Pyrenees Command. In addition, there were the two military zones of the Canary Islands and the Balearic Islands. Ceuta and Melilla fell within the Southern Command (see fig. 15). At the head of each regional and zonal command was an officer of two-star rank. Although his authority had been reduced, the regional commander, who held the title of captain general, was still among the most senior officers of the army.

Under its earlier organization, the army was grouped into two basic categories: the Immediate Intervention Forces and the

Territorial Operational Defense Forces. In theory, the former, consisting of three divisions and ten brigades, had the missions of defending the Pyrenean and the Gibraltar frontiers and of fulfilling Spain's security commitments abroad. The latter force, consisting of two mountain divisions and fourteen brigades, had the missions of maintaining security in the regional commands and of reinforcing the Civil Guard and the police against subversion and terrorism. In reality, most of the Immediate Intervention Forces were not positioned to carry out their ostensible mission of protecting the nation's borders. Many units were stationed near major cities—as a matter of convenience for officers who held part-time jobs—from which they also could be called upon to curb disturbances or unrest.

In a gradual process that had not been fully completed as of mid-1988, the division of the army into the Immediate Intervention Forces and the Territorial Operational Defense Forces was being abolished. The brigade had become the fundamental tactical unit. The total number of brigades had been reduced from twenty-four to fifteen by the dismantling of nine territorial defense brigades. Eleven of the brigades had been organized within the existing five divisions; three brigades were to be independent, and one was to be in general reserve.

The best equipped of the five was the First Division, the Brunete Armored Division, with its armored brigade in the Madrid area and its mechanized brigade farther to the southwest near Badajoz. The motorized Second Division, Guzmán el Bueno Division, which had acquired a third brigade as a result of the reorganization, was the major defensive force in the south, with full capability for rapid maneuver. The mechanized Third Division, the Maestrazgo Division, under the Levante Command, consisted of two brigades considered to have a medium degree of mobility. The two mountain divisions, the Fourth Division—or Urgel Division and the Fifth Division—or Navarra Division, each consisting of two mountain brigades, remained in the Pyrenean border area of the north. Two of the four independent brigades were armored cavalry, one was an airborne brigade, and one was a paratroop brigade (in general reserve).

Numerous other changes were introduced as well, including the reorganization of artillery forces not included in the major combat units. This involved the creation of a field artillery command that consisted of a restructured and consolidated former artillery brigade, the creation of a single straits coastal artillery command that replaced two former coastal artillery regiments, and the introduction

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Figure 15. Major Military Installations, 1988

of an anti-aircraft artillery command that was expected to benefit from significant modernizing of its weapons inventory.

The personnel strength of the army, which previously had been maintained at about 280,000, including 170,000 conscripts, had been trimmed to 240,000 by 1987. This was achieved through lower intakes of conscripts and volunteers and through cuts in the table of organization for officers and NCOs. The government's goal was a smaller but more capable army of 195,000 effectives by 1991. Outside peninsular Spain, about 19,000 troops were stationed in Ceuta and Melilla. These included, in addition to the Spanish Legion and other specialized units, four Regulares regiments of North Africans. An additional 5,800 troops were assigned to the Balearic Islands, and 10,000 were in the Canary Islands.

### **Spanish Legion**

The Spanish Legion, founded in Morocco in 1920, has always been under the direct command of the chief of the army staff. It has had a reputation as the toughest combat unit in the service. Although modeled after the French Foreign Legion, it never acquired the international flavor of its French counterpart. Reduced in size to 8,500 in 1987, as a result of successive reorganizations, the legion was scheduled to undergo further cuts to an overall strength of 6,500. It had a higher number of career soldiers than other units, but it was manned mostly by conscripts who had volunteered for the legion. Recruitment of non-Spanish personnel, who had never exceeded 10 percent of the group's manpower, ended in 1986. Foreign legionnaires already in the service were not affected.

As of 1987, the Spanish Legion was grouped into four *tercios* (sing., *tercio*), a unit intermediate between a regiment and a brigade, each commanded by a colonel. The first and the second *tercios* constituted the core of the military garrisons at Melilla and Ceuta. Each had been reduced by a motorized battalion, leaving it with a single motorized battalion, a mechanized battalion, an antitank company, and a headquarters company. They were equipped with BMR armored personnel carriers. The third *tercio*, stationed in the Canary Islands, consisted of two motorized battalions and a headquarters company. The fourth *tercio* was being converted from a support role to a combat unit at the legion headquarters in Ronda near Málaga.

In 1987 the Ministry of Defense was planning the creation of a rapid deployment force composed entirely of volunteers. This force, which would include the Spanish Legion, the paratroop brigade, the airborne brigade, and Marine units, would be available for use in trouble spots on twelve hours' notice. Lack of adequate air and naval transport would, however, be a limiting factor.

### **Equipment**

In spite of new procurement programs, introduced in the mid-1980s, arms and equipment were not in sufficient supply, and they were not up to the standards of other NATO armies. The inventory of medium tanks was made up of nearly 700 United States models dating back to the Korean War, as well as about 300 AMX-30s of French design but manufactured mostly in Spain between 1974 and 1983. Although the military felt that it was essential to adopt a new main battle tank for the 1990s, economic considerations led to a postponement of the decision and the

upgrading of the AMX-30s with new West German-designed diesel engines and transmissions, reactive armor panels, and laser fire-control systems.

Armored troop carriers included about 1,200 American-made M-113s as well as AML-60s and AML-90s of French design. The Spanish army was in the process of being equipped with more than 1,200 BMRs, a six-wheeled armored vehicle manufactured in Spain under French license. A variety of towed and self-propelled artillery was available, ranging from 105mm to 203mm guns and howitzers. The main antitank weapons were recoilless rifles; 88.9mm rocket launchers; Milan, Cobra, and Dragon missiles; and a small number of TOW (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided) and HOT (high subsonic, optically guided, tube-launched) anti-tank missile systems. A considerable quantity of additional anti-tank missiles and rocket launchers was on order. The army aircraft inventory included about 180 helicopters, about 40 of which were armed with 20mm guns or HOT antitank missiles (see table 16, Appendix).

The air defense of ground forces depended largely on outdated Bofors guns and on aging Hawk and Nike missiles. As of 1987, a start had been made on overcoming deficiencies in this area by acquiring French Roland missiles, to be mounted on AMX-30 chassis, and Italian Aspide missiles for fixed defense.

## **Navy**

The Spanish navy (Armada) was relatively large, ranking second in total tonnage, after the British navy, among European NATO nations. Its ship inventory, although aging, was being upgraded through a construction and modernization program. As part of its personnel reorganization, its strength had been reduced by 10,000 to 47,300 personnel, including marines, as of 1987. Of this number, about 34,000 were conscripts.

Subordinate to the commander in chief of the fleet, with his headquarters in Madrid, were four zonal commands: the Cantabrian Maritime Zone with its headquarters at El Ferrol del Caudillo (Ferrol) on the Atlantic coast; the Straits Maritime Zone with its headquarters at San Fernando near Cádiz; the Mediterranean Maritime Zone with its headquarters at Cartagena; and the Canary Islands Maritime Zone with its headquarters at Las Palmas de Gran Canaria.

Operational naval units were classified by mission, and they were assigned to the combat forces, the protective forces, or the auxiliary forces. The combat forces were given the tasks of conducting offensive and defensive operations against potential enemies and

of assuring maritime communications. Their principal vessels included a carrier group, naval aircraft, transports and landing vessels, submarines, and missile-armed fast attack craft. The protective forces had the mission of protecting maritime communications over both ocean and coastal routes and the approaches to ports and to maritime terminals. Their principal components were destroyers or frigates, corvettes, and minesweepers as well as marine units for the defense of naval installations. The auxiliary forces, responsible for transport and for provisioning at sea, also had such diverse tasks as coast guard operations, scientific work, and maintenance of training vessels. In addition to supply ships and a tanker, the force included older destroyers and a considerable number of patrol craft.

The largest vessel of the navy was the 15,000-ton aircraft carrier, *Príncipe de Asturias*, which had entered service in 1988 after completing sea trials. Built in Spain with extensive United States engineering assistance and financing, it was designed with a "ski-jump" takeoff deck. Its complement would be six to eight Harrier vertical (or short) takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft and as many as sixteen helicopters designed for antisubmarine warfare and support of marine landings.

The new carrier was to have as its escort group four frigates of the United States FFG-7 class, built in Spain and armed with Harpoon and Standard missiles. The first three were commissioned between 1986 and 1988; construction on the fourth was begun in 1987. Also in the inventory were five frigates, commissioned between 1973 and 1976 and built in Spain with United States assistance. Six slightly smaller vessels of Portuguese design, classified as corvettes, were constructed in Spain between 1978 and 1982 (see table 17, Appendix).

The fleet of eight submarines was built, based on French designs, with extensive French assistance. Four submarines of the Agosta class were constructed in Spain between 1983 and 1985. They were equipped with the submarine-launched version of the Exocet anti-ship missile. Four submarines of the Daphne class had been completed between 1973 and 1975. A number of United States destroyers of the Gearing and the Fletcher classes, constructed at the close of World War II, were also in the 1988 inventory, although the three remaining Fletcher class vessels were scheduled to be retired by 1990.

The marines, numbering 11,500 troops, were divided into base defense forces and landing forces. One of the three base defense battalions was stationed at each of the headquarters at Ferrol, Cartagena, and San Fernando. "Groups" (midway between battalions and

regiments) were stationed at Madrid and at Las Palmas de Gran Canaria. The fleet *tercio* (equal to a regiment), available for immediate embarkation, was based at San Fernando. Its principal arms included light tanks, armored personnel vehicles, self-propelled artillery, and TOW and Dragon antitank missiles.

### **Air Force**

The air force (Ejército del Aire), with a personnel strength of 33,000 as of 1987, of whom about 18,000 were conscripts, was organized into four operational commands—combat, tactical, transport, and Canary Islands. The Combat Air Command (Mando Aéreo de Combate—MACOM) had as its mission control over national airspace through the use of offensive and defensive interceptor operations. As of 1987, MACOM consisted of seven squadrons equipped with F-18 Hornets, F-4 Phantoms, Mirage F-1s, and Mirage IIIs (see table 18, Appendix).

The F-18s, introduced in 1986, were among the world's most up-to-date multipurpose fighter aircraft, with advanced navigational and target acquisition systems. Associated weaponry included Sparrow and Sidewinder anti-aircraft missiles, HARM anti-radar missiles, and Harpoon anti-ship missiles. The F-18s would permit replacement of the F-4 Phantoms, high-performance fighters of the 1960s generation. The version of Mirage III in the Spanish inventory, first introduced in 1964, was designed as a long-range fighter-bomber intruder. A more recent Mirage model, the F-1, was purchased in the 1974–75 period by the air force. The Mirage IIIs were scheduled to have new electronic attack and navigation systems installed, so that they could be kept in service through the 1990s.

The Tactical Air Command (Mando Aéreo Táctico—MATAC) had as its mission the support of ground forces. It was equipped with ten squadrons of SF-5 aircraft, one squadron of six Orion P-3A maritime reconnaissance aircraft, and one squadron of DO-27 type liaison aircraft. The SF-5s, modeled after the Northrop-designed American F-5, were assembled in Spain in three versions: attack-fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, and two-seat trainers. Modifications being carried out in 1987, involving installation of new communications, a plane identification system, and updated navigation and landing aids, were intended to keep the SF-5 operational until a replacement was available in the late 1990s. This was expected to be either one designed and manufactured in Spain or a more advanced model available through Spain's participation in the European fighter program (see Defense Production, this ch.).



*Spanish-made CASA aircraft  
Courtesy Embassy of Spain, Washington*

The Air Transport Command (Mando Aéreo de Transporte—MATRA) provided airlift capacity for the three services, as well as air evacuation, disaster relief, and paratroop carriers. The command possessed sixty aircraft, and it could conduct heavy logistical operations, using five C-130 Hercules transports and six KC-130s (for aerial refueling). The Spanish-built CASA C-212 Aviocar was the mainstay of the light transport fleet.

The Canary Islands Air Command (Mando Aéreo de Canarias—MACAN) was a mixed unit equipped to carry out multiple missions—interceptor, ground attack, transport, surveillance, and antisubmarine—at a distance of 1,500 kilometers from the mainland. Its air fleet included a squadron of Mirage F-1s armed for both interceptor and ground attack operations, a unit of ten CASA C-212 Aviocar light transports, and a squadron equipped for anti-submarine warfare with Fokker F-27 patrol aircraft and Aérospatiale AS-332B Super Puma helicopters.

The modernization efforts of the air force centered on the acquisition of seventy-two F-18s, produced by McDonnell Douglas in the United States. The first such planes—known as the EF-18A in Spain—arrived in 1986, and the final deliveries were scheduled for 1990. The cost of this program, which amounted to US\$1.8 billion for the aircraft alone, was to be offset in full by expenditures in Spain. These were to include support and overhaul for



CF-18s of the Canadian Air Force in Europe and for F-18s of the United States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

The principal MACOM bases were at Zaragoza, at Torrejón near Madrid, at Albacete, and at Manises near Valencia. The initial F-18 deliveries were assigned to two operational MACOM squadrons based at Zaragoza. Subsequent deliveries would replace the F-4s of two squadrons at Torrejón and two Mirage III squadrons at Manises. The SF-5s of MATAAC were based at Morón de la Frontera (Morón), and the Orion P-3As were at Jerez de la Frontera near Cádiz.

### **Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia**

Service uniforms for officers of all military services consisted of a blouse, shirt, tie, pants, black socks, and black shoes. Service uniforms for army and air force officers were similar in style, in that both were single-breasted and had four patch pockets, but different in color—olive green for the army and blue for the air force. The navy had a white and navy blue service uniform. Uniforms for enlisted personnel were more simply tailored, and they were made from heavier, longer wearing fabric. The army's enlisted personnel uniform jacket was similar to that worn by officers, but it lacked the lower patch pockets. Air force enlisted personnel wore waist-length jackets similar to those worn by officers. Navy enlisted personnel wore the conventional blues and whites. The military's field uniform consisted of an olive green fatigue jacket, a shirt, trousers, a belt with vertical shoulder suspenders, a field cap and/or a helmet, and combat boots. Additional field uniforms for special forces included winter and summer camouflage uniforms.

Ranks in all three military services generally corresponded to those in the armed forces of the United States. Each of the three services had ten officer ranks, ranging from the equivalent of second lieutenant in the army and the air force and ensign in the navy to general of the army, general of the air force, and fleet admiral. The only difference between the two countries' officer rank structures was that Spain had only four, rather than five, general officer ranks. The highest actual rank held by a general officer was that of three stars. Only the king, as supreme commander, held the four-star rank of captain general. Spain had eight enlisted grades for the army and the air force (as opposed to nine in the United States), ranging from basic private and airman basic to command sergeant major and chief master sergeant, respectively. Spain lacked an equivalent for the United States army grade of sergeant first class/master sergeant or its air force grade of master sergeant. The Spanish navy had only seven enlisted grades, ranging from seaman

apprentice to master chief petty officer. It lacked an equivalent for the United States grades of seaman recruit and chief petty officer.

Insignia of rank for Spanish military personnel were displayed on sleeves or shoulder boards and, in some cases, on headgear. Officer rank insignia were the same for the army and air force (a varying number and type of symbols in gold). Naval officer ranks were usually distinguishable by gold stripes worn on sleeves or shoulder boards (see fig. 16). Enlisted personnel ranks were designated by stripes: red for army private and private first class as well as for navy seaman and seaman apprentice; green (on shoulder boards) for air force airman first class; and gold for all other enlisted ranks including warrant officers, but on different colored backgrounds depending on the service (red background for army, blue for navy, and green for air force). In addition, army and air force warrant officers wore a single five-pointed star on service background; the naval warrant officer was identified by a single short horizontal stripe (see fig. 17).

## **Sources and Quality of Manpower**

Beginning in 1982, major changes in the military personnel system were introduced in an effort to deal with the chronic problem of overstaffing, to modernize recruitment procedures, and to improve the quality of education and training. The existing officer complement was far in excess of the number required by the new tables of organization adopted in the extensive reorganization of the army. A total of 41,328 soldiers were in the ranks of sergeant through lieutenant general in 1986; these were scheduled to be reduced to 35,213 by 1991. In 1986 a further 4,200 officers were in the active reserves, and 2,000 were in a special status called transitional active reserve, a voluntary category that had been created to induce officers to forego their final two years of active duty while retaining full pay.

The total number of trained reserves was reported to be 1,085,000, as of 1987. These personnel, who were considered reservists until the age of thirty-eight, theoretically would be available to form brigades needed to fill out incomplete divisions in an emergency. Reservists did not, however, attend periodic refresher courses or undergo retraining.

The mandatory retirement age for general officers, which had been between sixty-six and seventy prior to 1981, had been reduced to sixty-five—after conversion to active reserve status on full pay at age sixty-two to sixty-four—as of 1986. Active duty for majors, lieutenant colonels, colonels, and their naval equivalents was to end about five years earlier than it had previously, at age fifty-seven to sixty.

SPANISH RANK	ALFEREZ	TENIENTE	CAPITÁN	COMANDANTE	TENIENTE CORONEL	CORONEL	GENERAL DE BRIGADA	GENERAL DE DIVISION	TENIENTE GENERAL	CAPITÁN GENERAL
ARMY										
U.S. RANK TITLES	2D LIEUTENANT	1ST LIEUTENANT	CAPTAIN	MAJOR	LIEUTENANT COLONEL	COLONEL	BRIGADIER GENERAL	MAJOR GENERAL / LIEUTENANT GENERAL	GENERAL	GENERAL OF THE ARMY
SPANISH RANK	ALFEREZ	TENIENTE	CAPITÁN	COMANDANTE	TENIENTE CORONEL	CORONEL	GENERAL DE BRIGADA	GENERAL DE DIVISION	TENIENTE GENERAL	CAPITÁN GENERAL
AIR FORCE										
U.S. RANK TITLES	2D LIEUTENANT	1ST LIEUTENANT	CAPTAIN	MAJOR	LIEUTENANT COLONEL	COLONEL	BRIGADIER GENERAL	MAJOR GENERAL / LIEUTENANT GENERAL	GENERAL	GENERAL OF THE AIR FORCE
SPANISH RANK	ALFEREZ DE FRAGATA	ALFEREZ DE NAVIO	TENIENTE DE NAVIO	CAPITÁN DE CORBETA	CAPITÁN DE FRAGATA	CAPITÁN DE NAVIO	CONTRAL-MIRANTE	VICEAL-MIRANTE	ALMIRANTE	CAPITÁN GENERAL
NAVY										
U.S. RANK TITLES	ENSIGN	LIEUTENANT JUNIOR GRADE	LIEUTENANT	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER	COMMANDER	CAPTAIN	REAR ADMIRAL	VICE ADMIRAL	ADMIRAL	FLEET ADMIRAL

Figure 16. Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1988

SPANISH RANK	SOLDADO	SOLDADO PRIMERO	CABO	CABO PRIMERO	SARGENTO	SARGENTO PRIMERO	BRIGADA	SUBTENIENTE
<b>ARMY</b>	NO INSIGNIA							
U.S. RANK TITLES	BASIC PRIVATE	PRIVATE	PRIVATE 1ST CLASS	CORPORAL	SERGEANT	STAFF SERGEANT	SERGEANT MAJOR	COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR
<b>SPANISH RANK</b>	SOLDADO	SOLDADO PRIMERO	CABO	CABO PRIMERO	SARGENTO	SARGENTO PRIMERO	BRIGADA	SUBTENIENTE
<b>AIR FORCE</b>	NO INSIGNIA							
U.S. RANK TITLES	AIRMAN BASIC	AIRMAN	AIRMAN 1ST CLASS	SERGEANT	STAFF SERGEANT	TECHNICAL SERGEANT	SENIOR MASTER SERGEANT	CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT
<b>SPANISH RANK</b>	NO RANK	MARINERO DISTINGUIDO	CABO SEGUNDO	CABO PRIMERO	SARGENTO	SARGENTO PRIMERO	BRIGADA	SUBTENIENTE
<b>NAVY</b>								
U.S. RANK TITLES	SEAMAN RECRUIT	SEAMAN APPRENTICE	SEAMAN	PETTY OFFICER 3D CLASS	PETTY OFFICER 2D CLASS	PETTY OFFICER 1ST CLASS	SENIOR CHIEF PETTY OFFICER	FLEET FORCE MASTER CHIEF PETTY OFFICER

Figure 17. Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1988

In spite of these changes, it was evident that the number of army generals still would be excessive (143 in 1991) in relation to the small number of units at the level of division and brigade.

Military promotions historically had been based almost exclusively on seniority; with few exceptions, years in grade and age were the determining factors. Military officers knew with considerable certainty when they would advance in rank and whether or not vacancies existed for them at the new grade. Reforms in the promotion system, giving far greater weight to professional merit, to previous assignments, and to special training, were proposed as early as 1984, but only in 1987 was specific legislation introduced to modify the procedure.

Reforms of the salary system also were introduced to raise and to simplify military wage scales, making them consistent with the civil service wage structure. When the new system was introduced in 1985, it resulted in pay increases of between 15 percent (for sergeants) and 33 percent (for lieutenant generals). Total pay and allowances at the rate of exchange prevailing in 1988 would be the equivalent of US\$19,300 annually for a colonel, US\$14,800 for a captain, and US\$10,000 for a sergeant. No changes were proposed in the policy of paying conscripts only nominal wages, which amounted to only US\$5 a month in 1988.

Also included in the reform legislation of 1984 were a number of important changes affecting recruitment and conscription. For the first time, conscientious objectors were recognized officially and offered the possibility of alternate social service of eighteen to twenty-four months. Obligatory military service, previously set at fifteen months for the army and the air force, and at eighteen months for the navy, was to be reduced over a three-year period to twelve months for all services. A gradual shift in the call-up age, from twenty-one years to nineteen years, also was initiated. Voluntary recruits to all services would in the future serve for sixteen months rather than eighteen months (twenty-four months for the navy). In categories requiring specialized training, enlistments of two to three years would be required. The reason for these changes was the attempt to achieve an annual intake of 200,000 conscripts and 36,600 enlistees in 1986. The total number of young men qualified for military service would exceed these totals combined by an estimated 71,000. The conscripts would be concentrated in the army and the navy. Only 4,700 would be assigned to the air force, which expected to attract 16,000 volunteers each year.

The military conscription system was relatively unpopular; but the government vowed that it would be maintained. In a 1987 public opinion poll, 76 percent of those queried believed that some form

of service should be rendered to the state; however, only 17 percent felt that the service should be in the armed forces. The government's position was believed to be influenced by the high rate of unemployment among young men and the added cost of depending on voluntary enlistments. Moreover, the government was apprehensive that an all-professional army might be less accountable to civil authority.

Although the 1978 Constitution gives each citizen the right to serve in the armed forces, regardless of sex, the full integration of women had been met by strong resistance. About 8,000 women were included in a uniformed army auxiliary health corps, but they retained civilian status. A small number of women auxiliaries in the air force and the navy served in certain administrative jobs. As of early 1988, this situation was on the brink of change as the result of a royal decree providing for the progressive incorporation of women under equal conditions with males. Initially, women were to be permitted to apply for enlistment in the legal, the auditing, the engineering, the health, and the veterinary corps of the three services. Access to additional corps would be allowed as necessary organizational adaptations were completed. No action had been taken to open the service academies to women, although individual legal suits had been instituted by women seeking admission.

## **Training and Education**

Three service academies prepared young men as career officers. The General Military Academy at Zaragoza provided a four-year program leading to a commission as lieutenant in the army. The first two years and the fourth year consisted of joint studies at the academy; the third year was devoted to training specific to the branch of service selected. The five-year curriculum of the Naval Military School at Marín on the Atlantic coast included years one, two, and four based at the academy, a six-month to eight-month cruise on a school sailing ship during the third year, and a fifth year spent primarily aboard fleet units. At the General Air Academy at San Javier, the first three years consisted of basic studies and introductory flight training. The fourth year was devoted to the specialization chosen. Beginning with the entering class of 1987, a fifth year was to be added with further concentration on a specialization.

As part of the reforms announced in 1985, all of the academies were expected to provide similar levels of the general education needed to undertake future advanced studies; in particular, they were to strengthen the areas of the humanities and the social

sciences, including the courses on the constitutional and the justice systems. The curricula were to devote 20 percent of courses to the humanities and the social sciences, 20 percent to scientific and technical subjects, 10 percent to physical education and recreation, and 50 percent to military and professional training.

Competition for entry into the academies was keen. In 1986 only 194 out of 3,000 candidates were selected for the army academy, only 60 of 800 applicants were chosen for the naval academy, and only 78 out of 2,500 were accepted for the air academy. The entering classes were decidedly smaller than they had been in the past, in order to conform to the new tables of organization. In 1980, for example, 275 cadets had entered the army academy, 72 had been accepted in the naval academy, and 126, in the air academy.

Army noncommissioned officer (NCO) training was conducted at the Basic General Academy of Noncommissioned Officers (Academia General Básica de Suboficiales—AGBS), in an intensive three-year program. The first year consisted of basic military studies, the second year was spent in study in a technical training institute, and the third year consisted of further specialized technical training or additional leadership training at AGBS. Soldiers completing the course were promoted to the rank of sergeant. In spite of a large number of applicants—more than 10,000 in 1985—the number of candidates accepted was reduced from more than 1,100 in 1980 to 610 in 1986.

Each branch of the armed forces had a range of technical schools and preparatory courses for successive levels of command. The Ministry of Defense directly administered schools in such specialties as military justice, accounting, administration, and intelligence. Army colonels and lieutenant colonels with demonstrated aptitudes and qualifications could be assigned to the Higher Army School for command and staff studies. The Naval Warfare School prepared naval captains and marine colonels for higher commands. The Higher Air School provided corresponding command training to those air force officers demonstrating qualities expected to lead to general officer rank.

Training for ground force conscripts consisted of an initial four-month period of basic instruction and tactical exercises at the squad and the platoon levels. This was followed by two four-month training cycles providing collective larger-unit instruction and tactical exercises. Spanish observers asserted that insufficient time was devoted to training and that its quality was lax. Recruits complained that they were often inefficiently occupied, doing minor chores, sitting around barracks, or assigned to duties in commissaries and clubs. In addition to efforts to introduce more meaningful training

and to increase the amount of time devoted to training, the government hoped to meet other objections to the conscription system by instituting a new regionalization policy. To the extent permitted by national defense needs, servicemen were to be assigned to posts near their homes. The previous policy, introduced under Franco when the principal mission of the armed forces was internal security, was to send soldiers to regions where they had no personal ties.

The army continued to rely, to a considerable extent, on university students, who were fulfilling their twelve-month service obligation as second lieutenants, to serve as platoon commanders or as sergeants after only six months of basic training. Observers questioned the continued dependence on this recruiting source, which affected the caliber of training provided to conscripts and reduced the professional prospects of career NCOs. One reason for its retention was that limiting the number of career officers left the avenues for advancement to higher rank less cluttered.

## **Military Justice**

During the Franco regime, military courts were competent to try a wide array of political crimes by civilians, including terrorist acts and offenses against military honor by the press. Martial law was invoked frequently, enabling military courts to prosecute civilians charged with participating in strikes, demonstrations, and subversive meetings. In accordance with the requirements of the new 1978 Constitution, an organic law passed in 1980 abolished the jurisdiction of military courts over civilians. In addition, common crimes committed by military personnel were to be tried in civil courts, and sentences imposed by military courts were subject to review by the Supreme Council of Military Justice and by the civil Supreme Court as the final court of appeal.

A completely new Military Penal Code was adopted in late 1985. The new code introduced safeguards comparable to those of the civil criminal system, including the appointment of defense counsel and a ban against degrading punishment. It distinguished between conduct of a criminal character that was subject to criminal justice and disciplinary infractions that were to be handled by the military commands. The new code reduced the jurisdiction of military courts in the area of political crimes, such as rebellion, and it placed limits on the defense of obedience to legal authority in connection with illegal or unconstitutional acts. The death penalty was abolished for all but certain crimes committed in wartime, and even in such cases the death penalty was not to be mandatory.



## **The Defense Budget**

The defense budget for 1988 was set at 762 billion pesetas (for value of the peseta—see Glossary), or US\$6.74 billion based on 1988 rates of exchange. It was apportioned on the basis of 37 percent to the army, 24 percent to the navy, 19 percent to the air force, and 20 percent to centralized functions (the Ministry of Defense). The army budget, which had constituted 46 percent of the total in 1982, had begun to diminish as a result of reductions in army force levels. The shift also reflected major weapons acquisitions programs by the navy and the air force. The cost of centralized functions had risen as a result of the development of the new command structure, the consolidation of many operations that had previously been administered by individual services, and the decision of the minister of defense to control major equipment acquisitions more directly.

The 1988 defense budget was somewhat higher than the corresponding figures for 1987 (703 billion pesetas) and for 1986 (630 billion pesetas). In real terms, however, the rise in defense allocations had been lower than the annual rate of 4.432 percent planned for the eight-year period 1982-90. Moreover, the military budget had declined as a percentage of the total government budget, from 13.2 percent in 1978 to 8.81 percent in 1986. Military expenditures also declined slightly, during the same period, as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary), from 2.06 percent to 1.97 percent.

Although personnel costs remained high in proportion to total defense expenditures, a distinct reduction was recorded between 1982 and 1986, from 49.9 percent to 44.5 percent. Expenditures for construction and matériel expanded from 34.8 percent of the total in 1982 to 42.3 percent in 1986. Operating costs (of 15.3 percent in 1982 and 13.2 percent in 1986) were proportionately somewhat lower. Although the army was gradually bringing its personnel outlays under control, they continued to be much higher than those in the other services—58.8 percent of its total expenditures in 1988, compared with 31.3 percent in the navy and 33.5 percent in the air force. Moreover, because of their earlier starts on modernization programs, much higher shares of the navy and the air force budgets (over 50 percent for each in 1986) were being invested in equipment and in construction than was true in the army (22 percent in 1986).

According to a study prepared by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Spain ranked thirteenth among NATO's sixteen nations in military expenditures per capita,

calculated on the basis of 1985 defense budgets. With the exception of Luxembourg and Iceland, it ranked last in military expenditures as a percentage of GDP. Spain's defense outlays were well below the average of 3.4 percent of GDP attained by other European NATO countries.

## **Defense Production**

Spanish industry manufactured a significant share of the material requirements of the armed forces, notably light arms, vehicles, ships, and light transport aircraft. As a member of NATO, Spain had joined in the planning of several coproduction projects with other West European countries. Nearly 150 firms were engaged principally in defense production, and about 4,000 Spanish firms were linked in some way with the industry. Four large munitions manufacturers were directly controlled by the Ministry of Defense. A number of other major firms were part of the state holding company, the National Industrial Institute (Instituto Nacional de Industria—INI). A large group of purely private companies formed a third category. The ultimate intention of the Ministry of Defense was to transfer the four arms factories to the INI.

According to a 1986 survey of firms doing business with the Ministry of Defense, the manufacture of electronics accounted for about 20 percent of Spanish defense production; military vehicles for about 14 percent, supply of arms for approximately 13 percent, naval construction for about 8 percent, and aircraft construction for approximately 6 percent. Production of components and ancillary equipment made up the remaining approximately 39 percent.


Among the leading producers of army equipment was Empresa Nacional de Autocamiones S.A. (ENASA), generally known by the trade name of Pegaso, which manufactured a range of trucks and armored vehicles. Its basic BLR four-wheeled armored car was used primarily by the Spanish army; the six-wheeled BMR also was exported to Saudi Arabia and to Egypt. Most of the army's ordnance was produced by Empresa Nacional de Santa Bárbara de Industrias Militares (Santa Bárbara), including the CETME 5.56mm rifle, in general use by the Spanish army, and the AMX-30E tank, based on French technology. Santa Bárbara also manufactured the truck-mounted 140mm Teruel multiple rocket launcher. Larger naval vessels, including Spain's new aircraft carrier, French-designed submarines of the Daphne and the Agosta classes, and FFG-7 frigates of United States design, were constructed by Empresa Nacional Bazán de Construcciones Navales Militares (Bazán) at San Fernando near Cádiz.

The predominant aircraft manufacturer, Construcciones Aero-náuticas S.A. (CASA), was best known for the C-212, a short takeoff and landing utility plane with a three-ton payload. The company also produced the C-101, a trainer and light fighter, with assistance from West German and American aircraft companies that owned minority interests in CASA. The CN-235 turboprop, a forty-seat airliner with a military version, was being built in cooperation with an Indonesian firm. CASA also was reported in 1987 to be at the design stage of a plane—the Avión Experimental (AX)—that might be selected to replace the F-5 tactical fighters obtained from the United States. This would be an advanced version of the C-101, with an engine of much greater horsepower. CASA also assembled French-supplied kits for Aérospatiale Super Puma helicopters. It was the principal Spanish firm involved with British, West German, and Italian firms in the Eurofighter consortium planning an entirely new fighter aircraft for the latter half of the 1990s that was expected to replace the Mirages in the existing Spanish inventory.

Among other more advanced systems either being produced or in the planning phase were the French-designed Roland and the Italian Aspide air defense missile systems and the European attack helicopter AB-129. The latter was being developed in collaboration with Britain, Italy, and the Netherlands, with production foreseen for the 1990s.

The relatively small scale of Spain's own military orders spurred the Spanish armaments industry to develop its export potential and to increase its share of the international arms market. By 1987 it had risen to eighth rank as a world exporter, with a number of clients in the Middle East and in Latin America. In an analysis of 1985 results by an industry group, the Spanish Arms Manufacturers Association, export sales by member firms (125 billion pesetas) exceeded sales to the Ministry of Defense (90 billion pesetas).

As of 1988, Spain enforced sales embargoes against countries accused of human rights violations (e.g., South Africa, Chile, and Paraguay), Warsaw Pact and other communist countries, and active belligerents (e.g., Iran and Iraq). The Spanish press has, however, reported widespread violations of these controls, especially in the form of munitions shipments to Iran and to Iraq. Spain also had joined with other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries and Japan in controlling the export of militarily sensitive goods to communist destinations through the Paris-based Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM).



*Spanish-made military equipment on display during annual Spanish Armed Forces Day parade, Valladolid, May 29, 1984  
Courtesy United States Department of Defense*

## Participation in NATO

Membership in NATO had not been a practical alternative during Franco's lifetime because of the opprobrium with which the dictatorship was viewed by other West European states. Moreover, Franco displayed little interest in a Spanish contribution to West European security, regarding the Spanish military primarily as an instrument to protect the internal stability of the country. Only after his death was Spain able to contemplate the possibility of participation in the alliance. With the support of the political parties of the right and of the then-dominant Union of the Democratic Center (Unión de Centro Democrático—UCD), membership terms were successfully negotiated and approved by the Cortes in October 1981, in spite of opposition by the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español—PSOE) and the Communist Party of Spain (Partido Comunista de España—PCE). Although most European members were less enthusiastic over Spain's membership than was the United States, the agreement was quickly ratified, and Spain's formal entry as the sixteenth member—the first new member since West Germany, twenty-seven years earlier—took place in May 1982.

Spanish participation was to be accomplished in stages: first by membership in the political committees and eventually by integration into alliance military activities. A few months after entry, however, in October 1982, a new PSOE government took office under Prime Minister Felipe González Márquez, who had campaigned against Spanish adherence to the pact. González suspended further Spanish involvement in NATO military operations, pending a national referendum on Spain's continued membership. A strong anti-NATO movement had been growing among the Spanish people. In the eyes of many, NATO membership was linked to the issue of United States bases and to the likelihood of an increased military budget. Spanish opposition became part of the movement then gaining ground elsewhere in Europe to resist the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles on the continent. Nevertheless, a delay in calling the referendum until March 1986 was accompanied by a reevaluation in the PSOE attitude. By this time, González was openly supporting Spain's continued adherence, arguing that if Spain wished to benefit from membership in the European Community (EC), it would have to accept the responsibilities of membership in NATO as well (see *Spain and the European Community*; *Spain and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, ch. 4).

The referendum took the form of asking the electorate to agree

that it was in the national interest for Spain to remain in the alliance subject to three principles affirmed by the González government: that Spain would not be incorporated into the integrated military structure; that the ban on the installation, the storage, and the introduction of nuclear weapons on Spanish territory would be maintained; and that there would be an effort toward a progressive reduction in the United States military presence in Spain. Contrary to opinion polls predicting continued heavy opposition to Spanish membership, the government's proposal was approved by 52.6 percent to 39.8 percent.

The actual conditions of Spain's participation—as subsequently negotiated—were that Spain would remain a full member of the North Atlantic Council and its subordinate organs, that Spain would be present as an observer on the Nuclear Planning Group, that it would continue to be a member of the Defense Planning Committee and the Military Committee, and that it would appoint military representatives for liaison with the NATO military commands. Spain would continue to participate in logistical coordination, development of common equipment and matériel, and civil protection measures, reserving its position on participation in the integrated communication system. Spain would be permitted to nominate candidates for the NATO Secretariat and the International Military Staff. Observers later reported that Spain had offered to coordinate its national military missions with those of NATO, especially control of the sea between the Balearic Islands and the Canaries. Spanish forces were to be commanded only by Spanish officers, however, and no troops were to be deployed outside of Spain on a sustained basis. The Spanish air defense system, which was compatible with the NATO system, was to be linked also to the French and the Italian air defense systems.

In spite of the formal limitations on Spain's participation in NATO, the coordinated strategic planning envisaged by Spain was intended to make it possible for Spanish forces to operate in conjunction with NATO in an emergency. NATO planners viewed Spain's relatively secure landmass as a potentially major strategic asset, forming a marshaling area and a redoubt from which air and sea attacks could be launched against Warsaw Pact forces. In a crisis, it would be highly valuable as a transit center and a supply depot for reinforcement from the United States. The Spanish navy and air force, operating from bases located in the Balearic Islands and southern Spain, afforded NATO a stronger position in the western Mediterranean. The Canary Islands bases would be important for safeguarding shipping lanes, particularly for oil tankers bound for the North Atlantic and the North Sea. Moreover, the

addition of a new and important West European country imparted a useful psychological boost to NATO, helping to demonstrate the restored vitality of the alliance.

Politically, the United States and other NATO countries believed that, by establishing a closer association through NATO, Spain's new democratic course would be strengthened. They hoped that membership would offer the Spanish armed services a well-defined military mission and would distract them from involvement in domestic politics. A greater professionalism of the Spanish military was expected to result, as well as efforts to modernize and to improve the armed forces through collaboration with NATO, perhaps at a lower cost than would otherwise be the case.

The conditions limiting Spain's membership restricted the participation of Spanish ground forces in NATO exercises, although Spain conducted exercises with other NATO countries on a bilateral basis. In 1987 Spanish ships engaged in NATO air-naval maneuvers between the Bay of Biscay and the Canary Islands, an area of the Atlantic Ocean that Spain regarded as of strategic importance. Spanish officers were not eligible to hold allied command and staff positions, thereby denying them valuable broadening experience and exposure to modern doctrinal and tactical concepts. NATO funds were not available for infrastructure projects in Spain. Particularly in light of the deficiencies and the obsolescence of much of the army's equipment, Spain needed to increase its military budget considerably to bring its forces within reach of minimum NATO standards. Some Spanish critics argued that Spain had gained little advantage from its membership because it had failed to secure any commitment regarding the eventual cession of Gibraltar, and it had failed to obtain security guarantees covering Ceuta and Melilla, which remained outside NATO's area of collective defense.

Prime Minister González justified in part Spain's failure to accept the integrated military structure by pointing out that Spain had joined the alliance many years after its formation, when the command structure was already well established. A complex readjustment of existing commands would have been necessary, said González, which would have created conflict with other members. For example, Spain's maritime role in the Atlantic would appropriately fall under the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT). Under the system prevailing when Spain entered NATO, a command subordinate to SACLANT, the Iberian Atlantic Command (IBERLANT), headquartered at Lisbon under a Portuguese admiral, was responsible for surveillance and control of large ocean areas west of Portugal and south to the Tropic of



*Armored vehicles at military garrison near Seville  
Courtesy United States Department of Defense*



Cancer. Spain would appropriately have an important role in IBERLANT, but Portugal made it plain that it would be unwilling to cede command responsibilities to Spain, even on an alternating basis. Similarly, for fully effective defense of the strait, Spanish cooperation with British forces on Gibraltar would be indispensable. Spanish sensitivities on this issue, however, made it hardly imaginable for Spanish officers to be part of a combined NATO command, or to engage in area cooperation with British officers on Gibraltar, so long as Britain refused to negotiate seriously on the future of the stronghold.

In 1987 Spain changed its status from observer to full member on NATO's Nuclear Planning Group. It continued, however, to adhere to the policy, approved virtually unanimously during the parliamentary debate on NATO, that it would remain a nonnuclear power and that it would not agree to stockpile or to install nuclear weapons of NATO forces on its territory. In this respect, its position was similar to two other NATO members, Norway and Denmark. Spain had initially rejected adherence to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), asserting that the treaty was unbalanced in favor of the nuclear signatories. But in 1987, after finding that its nonadherence was complicating its nuclear fuel supply relationships in the EC and with other countries as well, Spain reversed its position and acceded to the treaty.

The issue of nuclear weapons had been politically charged since three thermonuclear bombs were spilled over Spanish territory and one dropped into Spanish coastal waters in 1966, following an air collision between a United States B-52 bomber and a KC-135 refueling plane. Although all the bombs eventually were recovered, subsequent agreements expressly committed the United States to refrain from storing nuclear devices or components on Spanish soil. The last American units with nuclear armaments were submarines equipped with Poseidon missiles that were based at the Rota naval complex until they were shifted to Holy Loch, Scotland.

## **Military Cooperation with the United States**

The Pact of Madrid, signed in 1953 by Spain and the United States, ended a period of virtual isolation for Spain, although the other victorious allies of World War II and much of the rest of the world remained hostile to what they regarded as a fascist regime sympathetic to the Nazi cause and established with Axis assistance. The 1953 accord took the form of three separate executive agreements that pledged the United States to furnish economic and military aid to Spain. The United States, in turn, was to be permitted to construct and to utilize air and naval bases on Spanish territory.

Although not a full-fledged military alliance, the pact did result in a substantial United States contribution to the improvement of Spain's defense capabilities. During the initial United States fiscal year (FY—see Glossary) 1954 to FY1961 phase, military aid amounted to US\$500 million, in grant form. Between FY1962 and FY1982, a further US\$1.238 billion of aid in the form of loans (US\$727 million) and grants (US\$511 million) was provided. During the period FY1983 to FY1986, United States military aid, entirely in the form of sales under concessional credit terms, averaged US\$400 million annually, but it declined to slightly more than US\$100 million annually in FY1987 and in FY1988. The military credits were scheduled to be phased out in FY1989, in keeping with Spain's growing self-sufficiency in national defense. More than 200 Spanish officers and NCOs received specialized training in the United States each year under a parallel program.

Although Spain had purchased some military equipment from countries other than the United States, and although some officers had received training in other countries, the only major foreign influence on the Spanish military between the end of World War II and Franco's death in 1975 had been the United States. After the democratic regime was installed in 1976, the United States continued to be Spain's predominant partner in military cooperation, in spite of that country's growing involvement with France and with other West European countries. Between 1982 and 1986, the value of arms shipments to Spain from the United States totaled US\$725 million. France was the second ranking supplier (US\$310 million), and West Germany was third (US\$50 million).

As of 1988, there were 12,000 United States military personnel in Spain, at four major bases and at several smaller communications and navigation facilities. The legal status of the American military personnel and their dependents was governed by status of forces accords that were similar to the standard NATO status of forces agreements. One of the major bases was the naval complex at Rota near Cádiz, northwest of the Strait of Gibraltar, which provided fuel and ammunition storage facilities for American forces. It was also a naval air base supporting antisubmarine warfare and ocean surveillance operations. Rota was the site of a United States Defense Communications System (DCS) terminal tied to a number of radar and microwave stations throughout Spain, with further linkage to DCS sites elsewhere in the Mediterranean, that remained in continuous contact with the United States Sixth Fleet.

The United States shared with Spain the use of three airbases: Torrejón, just east of Madrid; Zaragoza, in northeast Spain; and Morón, near Seville (Spanish, Sevilla) in southwest Spain. Torrejón

was the headquarters of the Sixteenth Air Force of United States Air Forces, Europe (USAFE). A tactical fighter wing of seventy-two F-16 aircraft at Torrejón was rotated to other USAFE airbases at Aviano, Italy, and at Incirlik, Turkey. Torrejón was, in addition, a staging, reinforcement, and logistical airlift base.

Zaragoza was the base for a detachment of five United States aerial refueling aircraft, and it also was used by USAFE as a tactical fighter training base. It was located near Spain's Bardenas Reales firing range, where gunnery and bombing techniques could be practiced. Morón served as a support base for units of USAFE, including a detachment of fifteen aerial refueling aircraft.

Torrejón, Zaragoza, and Morón were built initially as bases for Strategic Air Command (SAC) B-47 bombers, which had a relatively limited range. After the B-47s were phased out, SAC no longer needed the bases, but they continued to serve useful functions for airlift, communications, resupply, rear basing, and fighter training in conjunction with the NATO obligations of the United States.

As the time approached in 1987 for the renegotiation of the existing base agreement, which had entered into force in 1983 for a five-year period, pressures mounted for a reduction of the United States military presence in Spain. Communist political groups and elements of the PSOE had campaigned against the bases. Moreover, the base agreement had become a symbol of United States cooperation with the former Franco regime. It was important to many Spaniards to eliminate vestiges of this history by converting Spain's long-standing bilateral relations with the United States into a multilateral undertaking through NATO. According to a poll taken in early 1987, 53 percent of Spanish citizens regarded the bases as prejudicial to the security and the defense of Spain, and 47 percent thought they should be removed.

The outcome of the 1986 referendum on membership in NATO committed González to negotiate the reduction of the United States military presence in Spain. González insisted that the wing of seventy-two F-16 aircraft be removed from Torrejón as a condition for renewal of the base agreement, and he threatened to expel all United States forces in Spain if this demand were not accepted. His stand was considered unduly inflexible by the United States and inconsistent with an earlier Spanish commitment that the level of security would be left intact. The United States felt that Spain, the military contribution of which was minimal, was permitting domestic factors to dictate a weakening of NATO defenses. Even though Italy subsequently agreed to station the F-16 wing on its

territory, the cost of transfer would be high, and the unit would be in a more exposed position.

In January 1988, Spain and the United States announced jointly that agreement had been reached in principle on a new base agreement with an initial term of eight years, essentially meeting the conditions demanded by Spain. The F-16 fighter wing was to be removed from Torrejón within three years, by mid-1991. It was expected that this step would reduce the number of United States personnel in Spain by nearly one-half.

Use by the United States of the bases in Spain for non-NATO purposes was a matter requiring Spanish approval, which was not likely to be forthcoming unless the mission had Spain's endorsement. In keeping with its policy of avoiding involvement in the Arab-Israeli dispute, Spain withheld diplomatic clearance for the United States to use the bases to resupply Israel during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War. González reportedly was approached indirectly regarding the possible use of the Spanish bases and overflights of Spain in connection with the United States raid on Libya in April 1986. His negative response necessitated a long detour over international waters by the aircraft flying from British bases. One of the American fighter-bombers was forced to make an emergency landing at Rota, however. González defended the landing as consistent with the provisions of the base agreement, in spite of the criticism that it evoked in Spain.

### **Public Order and Internal Security**

The transition from Franco's dictatorship to a system of parliamentary democracy was accompanied by a major effort to bring the forces of law and order and the justice system into harmony with the new political era. The police were stripped of most of their military characteristics. The Civil Guard, which maintained order in rural areas and in smaller communities, retained many of its military features, but both the Civil Guard and the police were placed under civilian leadership. Once dedicated to repressing all evidence of opposition to the Franco regime, the police and the Civil Guard were expected to tolerate forms of conduct previously banned and to protect individual rights conferred by the 1978 Constitution and by subsequent legislation. Members of the Civil Guard continued to be implicated in cases of mistreatment and brutality in the campaign against Basque terrorism. The authorities had, however, prosecuted many guardsmen for such infractions, with the result that by 1988 fewer violations of legal norms were being recorded.

Reforms of the judicial system included appointments of judges by a body insulated from political pressures and increased budgets to enable courts to deal with a chronic backlog of criminal hearings. The penal code was being modernized to bring it into conformity with the new Constitution. Some progress had been made in ensuring that defendants had effective legal representation and that they received speedier trials. Nevertheless, antiquated procedures and the escalation of crime continued to generate huge delays in the administration of justice, with the result that as much as half of the prison population in 1986 consisted of accused persons still awaiting trial.

### **The Police System**

The principal forces of public order and security as of 1988 were the Civil Guard and the National Police Corps (Cuerpo Nacional de Policía). The Civil Guard, fortified by nearly a century and a half of tradition, was a highly disciplined paramilitary body with close links to the army. As it evolved, it served mainly as a rural police to protect property and order and to reinforce the authority of the central government. Under Franco, a tripartite system of police was formalized: the Civil Guard in rural areas; the Armed and Traffic Police (renamed the National Police in 1979), which fulfilled normal police functions in communities with a population of more than 20,000; and the Higher Police Corps of plainclothes police with responsibility for investigating crimes and political offenses. Separate municipal police forces under the control of local mayors were concerned mainly with traffic control and with enforcement of local ordinances.

During the Franco era, the police had been regarded as a reactionary element, associated in the public mind with internal surveillance and political repression. The Civil Guard and the Armed and Traffic Police were legally part of the armed forces, and their senior officers were drawn from the army. The 1978 Constitution effects the separation of the police from the military, and it emphasizes that one of the functions of the police is to safeguard personal liberties. Article 104 of the 1978 Constitution states that, "The Security Corps and Forces, responsible to the Government, shall have as their mission the protection of the free exercise of rights and liberties and the guaranteeing of the safety of citizens." Although considerably delayed, a subsequent statute, the Organic Law on the Security Corps and Forces, was enacted in March 1986 to incorporate the mandate of the Constitution to redefine the functions and the operating principles of the police forces. With its passage, the final legal steps had been taken to make the police system


conform to the requirements of the democratic regime, although most observers concluded that it would be years before the reforms were fully in effect.

The new organic law provided a common ethical code for police practices, affirmed trade union rights, recast the role of the judicial police serving under the courts and the public prosecutors, combined the uniformed and the nonuniformed police into the single National Police Corps, and redefined the missions and the chains of command of the various police elements. The Civil Guard remained a separate paramilitary force, although in operational matters it was under the direction of the Ministry of Interior rather than the Ministry of Defense. In time of war or emergency, it would revert to the authority of the minister of defense. In 1986 a new post of secretary of state for security was created in the Ministry of Interior to coordinate the activities of the National Police Corps and the Civil Guard. The National Police Corps functioned under the directives of the director general of the National Police Corps, but local supervision was exercised by civil governors of the provinces where police forces served (see fig. 18).

### *The Civil Guard*

Patterned after the French rural gendarmerie when it was formed in 1844, the Civil Guard has long maintained its own traditions and style of operation. Until the first civilian director general of the Civil Guard was installed in 1986, its head had been an army lieutenant general. The total complement of the Civil Guard as of 1986 was 65,000; in addition, about 9,000 auxiliary guardsmen performed their military service obligation in the Civil Guard.

The Civil Guard was grouped into six zones, matching the six army regions, each commanded by an army brigadier general. These were divided, in turn, into commands coinciding with provincial boundaries and further subdivided into about 300 companies, 800 lines (*lineas*) corresponding to platoons, and about 3,200 posts. A post typically consisted of six to ten guardsmen, headed by a corporal or a sergeant. Posts were responsible for organizing two-member patrols to police their areas, generally by automobile. To deploy forces more flexibly, this traditional system had been augmented by radio-controlled mobile patrols of three or more members. A separate traffic group patrolled the main roads to assist in cases of breakdown or accident. A Rural Antiterrorist Group of four companies, stationed in the Basque Country (Spanish, País Vasco; Basque, Euskadi) and Navarre (Spanish, Navarra), concentrated its efforts against Basque extremists. This force could be supplemented by a helicopter unit and by a Special Intervention



Source: Based on information from Ian R. MacDonald, "The Police System of Spain," in *Police and Public Order in Europe*, John Roach and Juergen Thomanek (eds.), London, 1985, 215-54.

Figure 18. Organization of Police Services, 1988

Unit as needed. Mountain Units guarded the Pyrenees frontier against terrorists and smugglers, in addition to providing general police and rescue services.

The Civil Guard generally enjoyed greater popularity than other police elements, in part because of its reputation for courtesy and helpfulness to motorists. Nevertheless, it had not completely shed its earlier reputation as the primary instrument of the Franco regime's efforts to root out and crush any evidence of opposition. Numerous cases of torture and ill treatment were attributed to members of the Civil Guard, especially in the handling of suspected Basque dissidents (see Criminal Justice and the Penal System, this ch.). The persistence of reactionary tendencies was underscored by the participation of a senior officer of the Civil Guard, Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero Molina, in the dramatic coup attempt of 1981, backed by nearly 300 guardsmen who made prisoners of cabinet ministers and deputies of the Cortes (see *The Military in Political Life*, this ch.).

Most members of the Civil Guard were housed with their families on compounds that formed part of the stations from which they operated. A high proportion of recruits were the sons of guardsmen. Entrance was at the age of sixteen years or seventeen years, when recruits began a two-year course at one of two "colleges" or, alternatively, at ages nineteen to twenty-four at the other college where the course was of eleven months duration. Promotion to officer rank was possible after fourteen years of service. A minority of officers gained direct commissions by attending the General Military Academy at Zaragoza for two years, where they followed the regular military cadet curriculum. After an additional three years at the Special Academy of the Civil Guard at Aranjuez, these cadets entered the service as lieutenants.

Under the 1986 organic law, the Ministry of Interior was assigned responsibility for operational matters, pay, assignments, accommodations, and equipment. The Ministry of Defense was responsible for promotions, military missions, and wartime mobilization. Recruitment, training, weapons, deployment, and conduct of the system whereby compulsory service could be performed in the Civil Guard were matters of joint responsibility. The regulations introduced in early 1988 enabling women to serve in certain categories of the armed forces also cleared the way for eventual recruitment of women into the Civil Guard.

The 1986 law set out a new functional division of responsibilities between the Civil Guard and the National Police Corps. In addition to its rural police functions, the Civil Guard was to be responsible for firearms and explosives control; traffic policing on



interurban roads; protection of communication routes, coasts, frontiers, ports, and airports; enforcement of environmental and conservation laws, including those governing hunting and fishing; and interurban transport of prisoners.

### *The National Police Corps*

The 1986 organic law unifying the separate uniformed and plainclothes branches of the national police was a major reform that required a considerable period of time to be brought into full effect. The former plainclothes service, known as the Higher Police Corps, but often referred to as the "secret police," consisted of some 9,000 officers. Prior to 1986, it had a supervisory and coordinating role in police operations, conducted domestic surveillance, collected intelligence, investigated major crimes, issued identity documents, and carried out liaison with foreign police forces.

The uniformed service was a completely separate organization with a complement of about 50,000 officers, including a small number of female recruits who were first accepted for training in 1984. The Director General of the National Police Corps, a senior official of the Ministry of Interior, commanded 13 regional headquarters, 50 provincial offices, and about 190 municipal police stations. In the nine largest cities, several district police stations served separate sections of the city. The chief of police of each station was in command of both the uniformed and the plainclothes officers attached to the station. A centrally controlled Special Operations Group (Grupo Especial de Operaciones—GEO) was an elite fighting unit trained to deal with terrorist and hostage situations.

The principal weapons regularly used by the uniformed police were 9mm pistols, 9mm submachine guns, CETME and NATO 7.62mm rifles, and various forms of riot equipment. The uniform consisted of light brown trousers and dark brown jackets.

The initial training phase for recruits to the National Police Corps was nine months, followed by a year of practical training. Promotions to corporal, sergeant, and sergeant major were based on seniority, additional training, and performance. In the Franco era, most police officers were seconded from the army. Under a 1978 law, future police officers were to receive separate training, and army officers detailed to the police were to be permanently transferred. By 1986 only 170 army officers remained in the National Police Corps. Under the 1986 organic law, military-type training for police was to be terminated, and all candidate officers were to attend the Higher Police School at Ávila, which previously had served as the three-year training center for the Higher Police Corps. The ranks of the plainclothes corps—commissioners, subcommissioners, and

inspectors of first, second, and third class—were to be assimilated into the ranking system of the uniformed police—colonel, lieutenant colonel, major, captain, and lieutenant. Two lower categories—subinspection and basic—would include all nonofficer uniformed personnel. The newly unified National Police Corps was to be responsible for issuing identity cards and passports, as well as for immigration and deportation controls, refugees, extradition, deportation, gambling controls, drugs, and supervision of private security forces.

Franco's Armed and Traffic Police had once been dreaded as one of the most familiar symbols of the regime's oppressiveness. During the 1980s, however, the police effected an internal transformation, adopting wholeheartedly the new democratic spirit of the times. The police unwaveringly supported the legally constituted government during the 1981 coup attempt. Led by the new police trade union, the police demonstrated in 1985 against right-wing militants in their ranks and cooperated in efforts to punish misconduct and abuses of civil rights by individual officers.

### *Other Police Forces*

Although their powers were, in most cases, quite limited, the local police services of individual towns and cities supplemented the work of the National Police Corps, dealing with such matters as traffic, parking, monitoring public demonstrations, guarding municipal buildings, and enforcing local ordinances. They also collaborated with the National Police Corps by providing personnel to assist in crowd control. Numbering about 37,000 individuals in 1986, the local police were generally armed only with pistols.

Under the Statutes of Autonomy of 1979, the Basque Country and Catalonia were granted authority to form their own regional police forces. Subsequently, ten of the seventeen autonomous regions were extended the right to create their own forces, but, as of 1988, only three areas—the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Navarre—had developed regional police units. The 1986 organic law defined the limits of competence for regional police forces, although the restrictions imposed did not apply to the existing forces in the Basque Country and Navarre and applied only in part to those in Catalonia. Under the law, regional police could enforce regional legislation, protect regional offices, and, in cooperation with national forces, could police public places, control demonstrations and crowds, and perform duties in support of the judiciary. A Security Policy Council was established at the national level to ensure proper coordination with the new regional forces, which, as of 1986, numbered about 4,500 officers.

### *Intelligence Services*

The principal intelligence agency was the Higher Defense Intelligence Center (Centro Superior de Información de la Defensa—CESID), created in 1977 to replace the intelligence organizations of the Francoist period. These included the Political-Social Brigade—a special branch of the plainclothes corps—and the Intelligence Service of the Civil Guard. With their files on every part of the rural and urban population, these bodies carried on close surveillance and political intimidation on behalf of the Franco regime.

By a royal decree of January 1984, CESID was defined legally as the intelligence agency of the prime minister. Nevertheless, it was fundamentally military in nature, and its head in 1988 was an army lieutenant general, Emilio Alanso Manglano. Observers speculated, however, that Manglano, who had held the post since 1981, eventually would be succeeded by a civilian.

Employing about 2,000 individuals as of 1988, CESID was staffed primarily by the military, supplemented by 500 members of the Civil Guard and by 80 plainclothes police. About 30 percent of the members of the staff were civilians, said to be selected usually from among close relatives of military officers. Women had been confined largely to administrative tasks, but they were increasingly being entrusted with operational assignments.

The principal operating units were domestic intelligence; foreign intelligence; counterintelligence; economics and technology (primarily industrial espionage); and operational support (principally application of devices for surveillance and eavesdropping). Considerable emphasis in external intelligence was allotted to North Africa and to the security of Ceuta and Melilla. Liaison was maintained with a number of intelligence services of North African and Middle Eastern nations, as well as with the Israeli agency, Mossad. Interception of ship transmissions in the strait area was another focus of activity. Domestic intelligence centered on exposure of plots against the government, monitoring activities of unrecognized political parties, and counterterrorism.

Although CESID was the senior agency, it did not have a firmly established coordinating function over other intelligence bodies, which included the General Headquarters of Information of the Ministry of Defense; the second sections of the army, the air force, and the navy staffs; and the Civil Guard Information Service, dedicated to criminal and terrorist intelligence. In addition, the National Police Corps had a General Commissariat of Intelligence, with an antiterrorist mission that included a Foreign Intelligence Brigade

to investigate international terrorism aimed against Spain. Considerable rivalry and overlapping of missions characterized the entire intelligence system. CESID, in particular, was reported to be seeking to gain exclusive jurisdiction over police foreign intelligence activities.

### **Criminal Justice and the Penal System**

Spain's criminal justice system, which is based on Roman law, extends customary procedural safeguards to accused persons. Article 17 of the 1978 Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. It also provides that there be a maximum period of preventive detention (set by law at seventy-two hours), and that the arrested person be informed of his or her rights, including the right to an attorney, the right to an explanation of the reason for the arrest, and the right to be present at the trial. The Constitution abolishes the death penalty, except for certain military crimes in wartime. Under the Socialist government that took office in 1982, laws were passed providing for a limited right of habeas corpus for suspects to appeal against illegal detention or mistreatment. Defendants unable to afford counsel were assured of free legal assistance. A Public Defender's Office was formed that had authority to look into complaints by citizens and to initiate investigations. Trial by jury, which had been abolished by Franco, was part of the Socialist electoral program, but its introduction was delayed by differences with the judiciary as to the precise role the jury would play.

A full-scale revision of the Penal Code was being prepared in the late 1980s, but a number of significant changes had already taken effect. The principle of suspended sentences was introduced. Pollution of the environment was made a crime, and distinctions were introduced between hard and soft narcotics in sentencing illicit producers and dealers. Earlier provisions of law that had legalized the possession of small quantities of soft drugs were reaffirmed.

After the Civil War, crimes involving the security of the state were handled outside the regular court system. From 1941 until 1963, military courts had sole charge of all crimes against national security, in many cases through summary courts martial. Offenses ranging from treason and sabotage to the fostering of strikes and membership in illegal associations came under the jurisdiction of military courts. In 1963 Franco created the three-judge civilian Court for Public Order to deal with all nonterrorist internal security offenses, such as belonging to illegal parties and distributing antigovernment propaganda. In 1968, however, and again in 1975, after intensified terrorist action, various crimes were added to the

state security category, restoring them to military jurisdiction. In 1980 the charging or the trying of civilians by military courts was prohibited.

Antiterrorist laws adopted in 1980 and in 1981, in response to a wave of killings by Basque terrorists, had the effect of suspending certain constitutional guarantees. Anyone charged with supporting terrorism could be held virtually incommunicado for up to ten days (later reduced to three days). A suspect's home could be searched, his mail opened, and his telephone tapped. A detainee in a terrorism case had the right to an appointed attorney who could formally advise him of his rights, and who might be present during his interrogation, but who could not consult with the detainee until the interrogation was completed.

The international human rights group, Amnesty International, Spanish civil rights organizations, and the Spanish press have drawn attention to abuses of these exceptional powers given to police under the antiterrorism laws. In several of its annual reports, Amnesty International has said that detainees were not accorded access to counsel while in custody, that few were actually charged with crimes, that habeas corpus rights were not respected, and that insufficient judicial and medical supervision was exercised. The organization's claims of widespread mistreatment and torture, mainly of alleged members of Basque terrorist organizations, were supported by the annual reports on human rights of the United States Department of State. The Spanish government asserted, for its part, that detainees under the antiterrorist laws routinely lodged complaints of police brutality or torture, whether or not there was cause. Nevertheless, in 1986 the courts sentenced thirty-nine members of security forces for mistreatment of prisoners, and an estimated 150 additional cases were pending.

One of the most persistent problems of the judicial system was the delay in bringing cases to trial. As of 1986, these delays averaged eighteen months for minor offenses and between two and four years for serious crimes. In 1980, in an effort to curb the growing incidence of crime, bail was made available only for those accused of crimes for which the penalty was six months or less. By 1983 the large number of prisoners awaiting trial obliged the government to introduce a law raising to two years the maximum time that an accused could be held pending trial on a minor charge and to four years, on a serious charge.

Spanish statistics reflected increases of 5 to 10 percent annually in the incidence of crime during the late 1970s and the 1980s. Foreign tourists in particular were frequent victims of armed and violent robberies. The rise was attributed largely to the economic and

social problems of urban areas where recent high-school and college graduates faced unemployment rates often in excess of 20 percent (see *The Unemployment Problem*, ch. 3). The growing problem of drug addiction also contributed to the number of robberies in cities and in resort areas.

Over 90 percent of all crimes reported in 1986 were offenses against property. The next most significant crimes—against persons and internal security as well as the abandonment of family and personal injury—each contributed only between 1 and 2 percent to the total. Despite liberal laws in this area, the number of persons arrested on narcotics charges rose from about 9,000 in 1980 to nearly 22,000 in 1987. Nevertheless, in Spain as a whole, the official crime rate continued to be lower than it was in most other countries of Western Europe.

The prison population as of 1987 consisted of 17,643 individuals, of whom 1,486 were women. Of the total, about 7,700 were serving sentences, and nearly 9,000 were detained pending trial. An additional 7,200 were inmates of other correctional institutions and halfway houses. Many complaints of overcrowding and inadequate medical attention had in the past been leveled against prison conditions. A series of riots between 1976 and 1978 had been provoked in major part by the crowding and by delays in sentencing. Under the Franco government, periodic amnesties had helped to reduce pressures from the expanding prison population. The ban in the 1978 Constitution against such amnesties had led to a buildup that necessitated an ambitious construction and renovation program. As a result, by 1984, one-third of existing prisons had been built in the previous five years, and many others had been modernized. Prisons, which numbered forty-seven in 1987, were located in most of the main population centers. The largest prisons by far were in Madrid and in Barcelona, each of which had inmate populations of more than 2,000. None of the others housed more than 800 prisoners.

Although in a 1978 report a committee of the Spanish Senate (upper chamber of the Cortes) had severely criticized the treatment of inmates, subsequent evidence indicated considerable improvement. The International Red Cross was permitted to inspect prison conditions whenever it desired. It reported that facilities were satisfactory in the majority of cases, and it described Yeserias Women's Prison in Madrid, where female militants of the Basque movement were held, as a model for the rest of the world. There were several open prisons from which inmates were allowed to return to the community for specified periods. Conjugal visits were allowed

on a limited basis. Rehabilitation facilities were said to be almost nonexistent, however.

### **Threats to Internal Security**

During the Franco regime, a wide spectrum of opposition groups carried on antigovernment and, in some cases, terrorist activities. Nevertheless, these movements were successfully contained by the authorities, who were determined to crush all forms of independent political expression. Most of the dissident activity abated with the introduction of a democratic system that extended legal recognition to hitherto banned political groups, including the Communist Party of Spain (Partido Comunista de España—PCE). The legitimacy of separatist movements was recognized by granting partial regional autonomy, which included legislatures with powers of taxation, policing, and education (see Regional Government, ch. 4).

As a consequence of these policies, political opposition groups presented no imminent threat to Spain's stability as of 1988, although the activities of Basque extremists continued to present a danger to the forces of internal security. The Basque terrorist movement did not, however, enjoy the active support of the majority of the Basque population, and it appeared to be in decline as a result of an increasingly effective police campaign.

The radical movement of Basque separatists was organized in 1959 when the group known as Basque Fatherland and Freedom (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna—ETA) broke away from the much larger Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco—PNV). The ETA adopted a policy of armed struggle in 1968; in practice, much of the violence was attributed to an extremist faction, the ETA Military Front (ETA Militar—ETA-M). A less violent faction, the ETA Political-Military Front (ETA Político-Militar—ETA-PM), pursued a strategy of mixing political activities with terrorist actions. The ETA-M was largely responsible for the mounting savagery of the attacks during the 1970s, which included the assassination of the prime minister, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, in 1973.

The election of a democratic national parliament in 1977 and a Basque parliament in 1980 brought little relief from ETA violence. Although avowedly socialist in orientation, ETA continued to justify its terrorist policies after the Socialist government came to power in 1982. It insisted that the PSOE was only a pawn of the capitalist and clerical forces that dominated Spain and that it had failed to offer real autonomy to the Basque people.

The ETA-M was considered to be the militant wing of Popular Unity (Herri Batasuna—HB), the most radical of three Basque

parties represented in the Cortes (see Political Parties, ch. 4). Although the HB increased its representation in the Cortes to five seats in 1986, it still received only 17 percent of the Basque vote. The party's platform included the compulsory teaching of the Basque language, Euskera, in the schools; the withdrawal of Spanish security forces from Basque territory; measures to restrict private capital; and the addition of Navarre to the three provinces of the north that constituted the existing autonomous community of the Basque Country. As its ultimate objective, the party favored complete independence from Spain.

ETA-M's strategy had been to carry out a series of carefully selected assassinations and bombings, each having important psychological or symbolic impact. The terrorists thus hoped to inspire a spiral of violence and counterviolence that would arouse feeling against "repression" by the security forces and that would perhaps provoke a right-wing coup by the armed services. A total of more than 700 deaths had been attributed to the movement by the close of 1987. The violence had reached its peak in 1980 when the death toll was eighty-five. Nearly two-thirds of those killed were members of the Civil Guard or the National Police Corps. Most of the remainder were civilians killed in bombings or caught in crossfire. The military represented only 7 percent of the deaths, but those selected for assassination were often senior officers holding prominent positions.

The activists of ETA-M, believed to number no more than 200 to 500 in 1986, were organized into cells of as few as 5 individuals. Most members were under thirty years of age, and they had served for an average of three years in this sideline to their ordinary jobs. Perhaps no more than 100 were actual gunmen, the others acting as messengers, transporting weapons and explosives, and providing support. A number of young women also served in ETA-M; they were said to be among the most uncompromising militants, willing to take risks that young men increasingly shunned.

By the mid-1980s, ETA-M appeared to be under growing pressure from the security forces, with the result that the incidence of terrorist acts had tapered off. Better use of informants, ambushes, raids, and tighter control of the border with France contributed to the success of the police efforts. In 1984 the Spanish government had announced a policy of "social integration," a form of amnesty offered to ETA members in exile or in Spanish jails if they renounced future acts of terrorism. Improved international cooperation was also important. In 1986 about 200 active terrorists were believed to be living among the large Basque population in the adjacent provinces of France, using French territory as sanctuary and



as a base for terrorist missions. Two years later, their numbers had been reduced to a few dozen as a result of intensified cooperation between Spanish and French security authorities. Until 1983 France, citing its tradition of granting political asylum, had been unwilling to extradite ETA members to Spain. France shifted to a more accommodating policy, after the new Socialist government took office in Spain, and permitted the extradition of a few ETA members, accused of specific crimes of violence, while resettling others in northern France or deporting them. In late 1987, the police claimed a crippling blow had been administered to the terrorists by the arrest of many senior members of ETA-M in both Spain and France and the discovery of caches of arms and explosives.

Sympathy among Basques for the extremists, which was already limited, diminished further following the bombing in 1987 of a supermarket garage in Barcelona, in which twenty-four innocent people were killed. Later in the same year, there was popular revulsion over the deaths of five children among eleven people killed in a bombing of family quarters of the Civil Guard at Zaragoza.

Beginning in late 1983, a right-wing force, the Antiterrorist Liberation Group (Grupo Antiterrorista de Liberación—GAL), began a campaign of revenge killings and bombings among suspected ETA terrorists, chiefly in France, where GAL was widely believed to be linked to the Civil Guard. At the same time, an offshoot of ETA-M, Spain Commando, targeted members of the Civil Guard and the armed forces in Madrid, where such attacks, which gained maximum publicity for the movement, had been on the rise.

ETA-M was at one time well financed by kidnappings, robberies, and the so-called "revolutionary tax" on Basque businessmen. Reportedly, however, after the reverses suffered by the terrorists in 1987, receipts from the tax had declined almost to zero.

The regional Basque police force, Ertzaintza, formed in 1981, originally was assigned to traffic and other nonsecurity duties, but in late 1986 it conducted its first engagement against ETA-M. A plan had been adopted for Ertzaintza gradually to take a larger role, but it was reported that Civil Guard officers were reluctant to turn over intelligence out of conviction that the autonomous police were infiltrated by ETA activists.

Other regional opposition groups—in the Canary Islands, Galicia, and Catalonia—did not present a threat to internal security forces that was comparable to ETA. The Catalan separatist organization Terra Lliure (Free Land), formed in 1980, was responsible for a series of bomb explosions, some of which had resulted in fatalities. In late 1987, a United States servicemen's club in Barcelona was attacked with grenades, and the United States

consulate was bombed. Terra Lliure and a newer group, the Catalan Red Liberation Army, both claimed responsibility. During the first part of 1987, a group dedicated to a separate Galician nation, the Free Galician Guerrilla People's Army, carried out bomb attacks against banks in a number of towns in Galicia.

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An official Spanish publication, *Ministerio de Defensa: Memoria Legislativa, 1982-86*, provides an authoritative explanation of the sweeping changes undertaken during the 1980s in the structure of national defense, defense policy, organization of the armed services, personnel and training policies, and modernization of equipment. The role of the armed forces under Franco, the strained relations between military and civil authorities during the transition to democracy, and the government's successful efforts to introduce its reform measures are reviewed in a study by Carolyn P. Boyd and James M. Boyden included in *Politics and Change in Spain*, edited by Thomas D. Lancaster and Gary Prevost. Briefer accounts covering the same topics can be found in John Hooper's *The Spaniards: A Portrait of the New Spain* and Robert Graham's *Spain: A Nation Comes of Age*. Analyses by several scholars of Spanish security concerns, relating to the North African enclaves, Gibraltar, and the implications of Spain's membership in NATO, can be found in *Spain: Studies in Political Security* edited by Joyce Lasky Shub and Raymond Carr. An article by Victor Alba also addresses the domestic political and military factors bearing on Spanish entry into NATO. Strategic considerations of Spanish participation in the defense of Europe are weighed in a study by Stewart Menaul, *The Geostrategic Importance of the Iberian Peninsula*. The uncertainties arising from the special conditions of Spain's adherence to NATO are emphasized in "Spain in NATO: An Unusual Kind of Participation," by Carlos Robles Piquer. The changes in the character of the Spanish police services and the Civil Guard are detailed in two articles by Ian R. MacDonald. In *Spain and the ETA: The Bid for Basque Autonomy*, Edward Moxon-Browne provides background on an internal security problem that has troubled Spain for many years. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)



## Appendix

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Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

When you know	Multiply by	To find
Millimeters .....	0.04	inches
Centimeters .....	0.39	inches
Meters .....	3.3	feet
Kilometers .....	0.62	miles
Hectares (10,000 m <sup>2</sup> ) .....	2.47	acres
Square kilometers .....	0.39	square miles
Cubic meters .....	35.3	cubic feet
Liters .....	0.26	gallons
Kilograms .....	2.2	pounds
Metric tons .....	0.98	long tons
.....	1.1	short tons
.....	2,204	pounds
Degrees Celsius .....	9	degrees Fahrenheit
(Centigrade)	divide by 5 and add 32	

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*Table 2. Selected Election Results for the Congress of Deputies, 1977-86*

1977			1979		
Party	Valid Votes	Percentage	Party	Valid Votes	Percentage
UCD	6,337,288	34.61	UCD	6,292,102	35.02
PSOE	5,358,781	29.27	PSOE	5,477,037	30.49
PCE	1,718,026	9.38	PCE	1,940,236	10.80
AP	1,525,028	8.33	CD	1,070,721	5.96
CiU	514,647	2.81	CiU	483,446	2.69
PNV	314,409	1.72	PNV	275,292	1.53
EE	60,312	0.33	HB	172,110	0.96
			EE	85,677	0.48

1982			1986		
Party	Valid Votes	Percentage	Party	Valid Votes	Percentage
PSOE	10,127,392	48.4	PSOE	8,887,345	44.3
AP	5,409,229	25.9	CP	5,245,396	26.2
UCD	1,425,248	6.8	CDS	1,862,856	9.3
AP/UCD *	139,148	0.6	CiU	1,012,054	5.0
PCE	846,440	4.0	IU	930,223	4.6
CiU	772,726	3.7	PNV	308,991	1.5
CDS	604,293	2.9	HB	231,558	1.2
PNV	395,656	1.9	EE	106,937	0.5
HB	210,601	1.0			
EE	100,326	0.5			

AP—Popular Alliance.

CD—Democratic Coalition (led by AP).

CDS—Democratic and Social Center.

CiU—Convergence and Union Party.

CP—Popular Coalition (led by AP).

EE—Basque Left.

HB—Popular Unity.

IU—United Left (leftist alliance dominated by PCE).

PCE—Communist Party of Spain.

PNV—Basque Nationalist Party.

PSOE—Spanish Socialist Workers' Party.

UCD—Union of the Democratic Center.

\* These parties formed an alliance in three Basque provinces for the 1982 elections.

*Table 3. Total Population and Annual Growth Rates, Census Years, 1860-1981*

Census Year	Population	Annual Growth Rate	Census Year	Population	Annual Growth Rate
1860	15,655,467	0.34	1950	27,976,755	0.81
1910	19,927,150	0.72	1960	30,903,137	0.88
1920	21,303,162	0.69	1970	33,823,918	0.94
1930	23,563,867	1.06	1981	37,746,260	1.15
1940	25,877,971	0.98			

Source: Based on information from John Paxton (ed.), *The Statesman's Year-Book, 1989-1990*, New York, 1989, 1114.

*Table 4. Area, Population, and Density of the Autonomous Communities and Provinces in the Mid-decennial Census of April 1, 1986*

Autonomous Community Province	Area (in square kilometers)	Population	Inhabitants Per Square Kilometer
Andalusia	87,268	6,875,628	79
Almería	8,774	448,592	51
Cádiz	7,385	1,054,503	143
Córdoba	13,718	745,175	54
Granada	12,531	796,857	64
Huelva	10,085	430,918	43
Jaén	13,498	633,612	47
Málaga	7,276	1,215,479	167
Seville	14,001	1,550,492	111
Aragon	47,669	1,214,729	25
Huesca	15,671	220,824	14
Teruel	14,804	148,073	10
Zaragoza	17,194	845,832	49
Asturias	10,565	1,114,115	105
Balearic Islands	5,014	754,777	151
Basque Country	7,261	2,133,002	294
Álava	3,047	275,703	90
Guipúzcoa	1,997	688,894	345
Vizcaya	2,217	1,168,405	527
Canary Islands	7,273	1,614,882	222
Las Palmas	4,065	855,494	210
Santa Cruz de Tenerife	3,208	759,388	237
Cantabria	5,289	524,670	99
Castilla La Mancha	79,226	1,665,029	21
Albacete	14,858	342,278	23
Ciudad Real	19,749	477,967	24
Cuenca	17,061	210,932	12
Guadalajara	12,190	146,008	12
Toledo	15,368	487,844	32
Castilla y León	94,147	2,600,330	28
Ávila	8,048	179,207	22
Burgos	14,269	363,530	25
León	15,468	528,502	34
Palencia	8,029	188,472	23
Salamanca	12,336	366,668	30
Segovia	6,949	151,520	22
Soria	10,287	97,565	9
Valladolid	8,202	503,306	61
Zamora	10,559	221,560	21
Catalonia	31,970	5,977,008	187
Barcelona	7,773	4,598,249	592
Gerona	5,886	490,667	83
Lérida	12,028	356,811	30
Tarragona	6,283	531,281	85
Extremadura	41,602	1,088,543	26
Badajoz	21,657	664,516	31
Cáceres	19,945	424,027	21
Galicia	29,434	2,785,394	95
La Coruña	7,876	1,102,376	140



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*Table 4.—Continued*

Autonomous Community Province	Area (in square kilometers)	Population	Inhabitants Per Square Kilometer
Lugo .....	9,803	399,232	41
Orense .....	7,278	399,378	55
Pontevedra .....	4,477	884,408	198
Madrid .....	7,995	4,854,616	607
Murcia .....	11,317	1,014,285	90
Navarre .....	10,421	512,676	49
La Rioja .....	5,034	262,611	52
Valencia .....	23,305	3,772,002	162
Alicante .....	5,863	1,254,920	214
Castellón .....	6,679	437,320	65
Valencia .....	10,763	2,079,762	193

Source: Based on information from John Paxton (ed.), *The Statesman's Year-Book, 1989-1990*, New York, 1989, 1114-1115.

Table 5. Population of Principal Cities in the  
Mid-decennial Census of April 1, 1986

City	Population	City	Population
Albacete	127,169	Orense	102,455
Alicante	265,543	Oviedo	190,651
Almería	156,838	Palencia	76,707
Badajoz	126,340	Palma de Mallorca	321,112
Barcelona	1,694,064	Las Palmas de Gran Canaria	372,270
Bilbao	378,221	Pamplona	183,703
Burgos	163,910	Salamanca	166,615
Cáceres	79,342	San Sebastián	180,043
Cádiz	154,051	Santa Cruz de Tenerife	211,389
Cartagena	168,809	Santander	188,539
Castellón	129,813	Santiago de Compostela	104,045
Córdoba	304,826	Seville	668,356
La Coruña	241,808	Tarragona	109,557
Gerona	67,578	Valencia	738,575
Granada	280,592	Valladolid	341,194
Huelva	135,427	Vitoria	207,501
Jerez de la Frontera	180,444	Zaragoza	596,080
Jaén	102,826		
León	137,414		
Lérida	111,507		
Logroño	118,770		
Lugo	77,728		
Madrid	3,123,713		
Málaga	595,264		
Murcia	309,504		

Source: Based on information from John Paxton (ed.), *The Statesman's Year-Book, 1989-1990*, New York, 1989, 1115-1116.

Table 6. Number of Foreign Tourists and Earnings  
from Tourism, Selected Years, 1960-87

Year	Number of Tourists (in millions)	Earnings (in millions of United States dollars)
1960	6.1	350
1965	14.3	1,105
1970	24.1	1,681
1975	30.1	3,404
1980	38.0	6,968
1982	42.0	7,126
1984	43.0	7,717
1986	47.4	12,058
1987	50.5	14,760

Source: Based on information from Spain, Ministerio del Portavoz del Gobierno, *Spain, 1989*, Madrid, 1989, 141.

Table 7. Selected Crops, 1985-87  
(in thousands of tons)

Crop	1985	1986	1987
Almonds	287	221	250
Bananas	402	471	410
Barley	10,698	7,431	9,602
Cabbages	546	465	421
Corn	3,414	3,423	3,555
Grapes	5,450	5,788	6,181
Lemons	482	619	584
Mandarins	1,051	1,164	1,133
Oats	680	433	503
Olive oil	429	533	710
Onions	1,249	1,166	1,104
Oranges	1,968	2,135	2,359
Potatoes	5,927	5,125	5,379
Rice	463	496	490
Rye	273	220	320
Sugar beets	6,619	7,746	7,908
Tomatoes	2,429	2,400	2,347
Wheat	5,329	4,392	5,768

Source: Based on information from *Europa World Year Book, 1989*, 2, London, 1989, 2336.

Table 8. Fishing Industry Catches, 1984-86  
(in thousands of tons)

Type of Catch	1984	1985	1986
Blue mussels	116.8	103.3	118.3
Cephalopods			
Octopuses	54.1	51.5	45.9
Squid	26.1	23.6	66.6 *
Cod varieties			
Atlantic cod	35.5	38.3	54.6
Cape hake	119.0	136.4	147.9
European hake	55.1	46.3	42.3 *
Blue whiting	25.2	26.6	35.7
Mackerel varieties			
Atlantic horse mackerel	34.0	34.1	44.7
Atlantic mackerel	19.4	16.1	23.4
Cape horse mackerel	20.9	19.4	15.8
Sardines	257.1	229.0	173.2 *
Tuna varieties			
Albacore	17.5	21.4	22.1
Skipjack tuna	57.2	58.5	65.5
Yellowfin tuna	57.9	83.3	79.6
TOTAL (incl. others)	1,337.7	1,337.7	1,303.5

\* Estimates of the Food and Agriculture Organization.

Source: Based on information from *Europa World Year Book, 1989*, 2, London, 1989, 2337.

Table 9. Selected Mineral Production, 1986-87  
(in thousands of tons, net metal content)

	1986	1987
Copper .....	47	11
Fluorspar .....	278	196
Iron .....	2,778	2,042
Lead .....	80	78
Potassium salts .....	1,491	1,612
Pyrites .....	1,195	992
Tin * .....	281	71
Uranium * .....	373	380
Wolfram * .....	564	64
Zinc .....	223	225

\* in tons.

Source: Based on information from John Paxton, (ed.), *Statesman's Year-Book, 1989-1990*, New York, 1989, 1120.

Table 10. Composition of Foreign Trade, 1981 and 1987  
(in billions of pesetas)

Trade Items	1981	1987
<b>Imports</b>		
Capital goods .....	419.0	1,432.8
Consumer goods .....	278.1	1,193.6
Food .....	258.1	606.5
Fuels .....	1,259.6	986.5
Raw materials .....	334.2	508.8
Semi-finished products .....	421.5	1,301.6
Total imports .....	2,970.5	6,029.8
<b>Exports</b>		
Capital goods .....	296.3	617.3
Consumer goods .....	476.4	1,324.0
Food .....	347.0	739.8
Fuels .....	99.1	260.7
Raw materials .....	61.9	156.1
Semi-finished products .....	607.6	1,097.8
Total exports .....	1,888.3	4,195.7

Source: Based on information from Spain, Ministerio del Portavoz del Gobierno, *Spain, 1989*, Madrid, 1989, 150.

Table 11. Total Spanish Foreign Trade and Trade with Selected Partners, 1982-86  
(in millions of pesetas)

Year	Total	EC <sup>1</sup>	Br <sup>2</sup>	France	FRG <sup>3</sup>	US <sup>4</sup>	Japan	OPEC <sup>5</sup>	Comecon <sup>6</sup>
<b>IMPORTS</b>									
1982	3,465,539	1,100,475	170,379	275,316	328,225	478,276	110,526	929,549	106,633
1983	4,176,470	1,373,484	256,671	344,334	366,060	495,500	139,948	1,047,765	137,654
1984	4,628,991	1,583,587	281,083	398,049	458,737	519,278	141,787	1,118,687	158,234
1985	5,073,238	1,868,454	329,621	471,091	537,432	552,982	172,779	1,021,674	140,341
1986	4,890,767	2,458,096	377,652	571,425	736,088	482,717	240,906	551,563	98,923
<b>EXPORTS</b>									
1982	2,258,006	1,098,062	160,670	369,874	185,071	255,387	145,471	340,172	60,261
1983	2,838,601	1,424,859	219,887	448,737	260,186	345,209	206,640	397,766	87,178
1984	3,731,128	1,943,658	343,042	566,574	361,796	446,605	361,126	346,345	122,692
1985	4,104,143	2,142,398	351,294	635,017	392,478	475,488	408,561	300,116	170,279
1986	3,801,837	2,295,308	335,376	682,902	445,540	529,228	351,046	215,727	109,427

<sup>1</sup> European Community.

<sup>2</sup> Britain.

<sup>3</sup> Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany).

<sup>4</sup> United States.

<sup>5</sup> Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

<sup>6</sup> Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

Source: Based on information from Ramón Tamames, *Introducción a la economía española*, Madrid, 1987, 348.

Table 12. Foreign Investment in Spain by Country, 1982-87  
(in billions of pesetas)

Country	1982	1984	1986	1987	Percentage of Total Foreign Investment, 1982-87
Belgium .....	1.0	3.4	11.5	33.5	3
Britain .....	10.3	20.7	28.0	45.4	8
France .....	8.0	15.6	25.1	50.1	10
Italy .....	2.0	4.3	25.3	67.1	7
Japan .....	3.5	15.6	9.9	33.3	5
Netherlands .....	16.3	18.4	30.5	122.5	13
Switzerland .....	35.4	22.5	21.1	61.0	11
United States .....	42.3	35.0	32.1	40.1	14
West Germany .....	18.9	26.9	104.5	26.8	14
Others .....	24.7	75.4	52.0	60.5	17
TOTAL .....	162.4	237.8	340.0	540.3	100 *

\* Figure does not add to total because of rounding.

Source: Based on information from Mark Hudson and Stan Rudcenko, *Spain to 1992: Joining Europe's Mainstream*, Special Report No. 118, Economist Intelligence Unit, London, 1988, 112.

Table 13. Autonomous Communities and Date of Approval of  
Statutes of Autonomy

Autonomous Community	Approval Date
Basque Country .....	December 18, 1979
Catalonia .....	December 18, 1979
Galicia .....	April 6, 1981
Andalusia .....	December 30, 1981
Asturias .....	December 30, 1981
Cantabria .....	December 30, 1981
La Rioja .....	June 9, 1982
Murcia .....	June 9, 1982
Valencia .....	July 1, 1982
Aragon .....	August 10, 1982
Castilla La Mancha .....	August 10, 1982
Canary Islands .....	August 10, 1982
Navarre .....	August 10, 1982
Extremadura .....	February 25, 1983
Balearic Islands .....	February 25, 1983
Madrid .....	February 25, 1983
Castilla y León .....	February 25, 1983

*Table 14. Selected Regional Parties*

Name of Party	Ideology	Year Founded
Basque Left (Euskadiko Ezkerra—EE) . . . . .	leftist	1976
Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco—PNV) . . . . .	center-right	1894
Basque Solidarity (Eusko Alkartasuna—EA) . .	radical independentist	1986
Canary Independence Association (Agrupación Independiente Canaria—AIC) . . . . .	independentist	1986
Republican Left of Catalonia (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya—ERC) . . . . .	moderate left	1931
Convergence and Union (Convergència i Unió—CiU) . . . . .	center-right	1979
Galician Coalition (Coalición Galega—CG) . .	reformist	1985
Popular Unity (Herri Batasuna—HB) . . . . .	leftist	1978
Regionalist Aragonese Party (Partido Aragonés Regionalista—PAR) . . . . .	center-right	1977
Union of the Navarrese People (Unión del Pueblo Navarro—UPN) . . . . .	social Christian	1979

Table 15. *The Thirty Daily Newspapers with the Largest Circulations in 1987*

Newspaper	Place of Publication	Average Circulation in 1987
<i>El País</i> .....	Madrid and Barcelona	373,000
<i>ABC</i> .....	Madrid and Seville	247,000
<i>La Vanguardia</i> .....	Barcelona	201,000
<i>As</i> .....	Madrid	157,000
<i>El Periódico</i> .....	Barcelona	154,000
<i>Marca</i> .....	Madrid and Seville	144,000
<i>Diario 16</i> .....	Madrid and Seville	136,000
<i>El Correo Español-El Pueblo Vasco</i> ..	Bilbao	123,000
<i>La Voz de Galicia</i> .....	La Coruña	82,000
<i>El Diario Vasco</i> .....	San Sebastián	81,000
<i>Ya</i> .....	Madrid	75,000
<i>Las Provincias</i> .....	Valencia	56,000
<i>El Mundo Deportivo</i> .....	Barcelona	55,000
<i>Sport</i> .....	Barcelona	50,000
<i>Deia</i> .....	Bilbao	50,000
<i>Heraldo de Aragón</i> .....	Zaragoza	49,000
<i>Diario de Navarra</i> .....	Pamplona	43,000
<i>Egin</i> .....	Hernani	41,000
<i>La Verdad</i> .....	Murcia	40,000
<i>Avui</i> .....	Barcelona	39,000
<i>La Nueva España</i> .....	Oviedo	36,000
<i>El Faro de Vigo</i> .....	Vigo	32,000
<i>Sur</i> .....	Málaga	32,000
<i>La Provincia</i> .....	Las Palmas de Gran Canaria	32,000
<i>Información</i> .....	Alicante	31,000
<i>Diario de Cádiz</i> .....	Cádiz	28,000
<i>Levante</i> .....	Valencia	27,000
<i>Última Hora</i> .....	Palma de Mallorca	26,000
<i>El Diario Montañés</i> .....	Santander	26,000
<i>Ideal</i> .....	Granada	26,000

Source: Based on information from Ramón Tamames (ed.), *El País Anuario, 1989*, Madrid, 1989, 200.



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*Table 16. Major Army Equipment, 1987*

Type and Description	Country of Manufacture	Number in Inventory
<b>Tanks</b>		
AMX-30E .....	France/Spain	300
M-47E .....	United States	380
M-48A5E .....	-do-	164
M-41 .....	-do-	127
<b>Armored vehicles</b>		
M-113 armored personnel carriers .....	-do-	1,196
BMR-600 six-wheeled infantry combat vehicles .....	Spain	510
AML-60 reconnaissance vehicles .....	France	60
AML-90 light armored cars .....	-do-	80
<b>Self-propelled guns and howitzers</b>		
105mm M-108 howitzers .....	United States	48
155mm M-109A howitzers .....	-do-	96
175mm M-107 .....	-do-	12
203mm M-55 howitzers .....	-do-	4
<b>Towed Artillery</b>		
105mm M-26 and M-56 pack .....	United States	810
122mm 122/46 .....	Spain	188
155mm M-114 .....	United States	84
155mm M-44 .....	-do-	12
203mm M-115 .....	-do-	24
<b>Multiple Rocket Launchers</b>		
Teruel 140mm .....	Spain	12
L-21 216mm .....	-do-	16
Mortars: 81mm, 107mm, 120mm .....	various	1,200
<b>Antitank weapons</b>		
106mm recoilless rifles .....	United States	500
M-65 88.9mm rocket launchers .....	-do-	42
Milan, Cobra, Dragon, HOT, and TOW missiles .....	France and United States	130
<b>Air defense weapons</b>		
20mm, 35mm, 40mm, and 90mm guns .....	various	364
Nike, Hercules missiles .....	United States	9
Improved Hawk .....	-do-	24
Roland .....	France	n.a.
Aspide .....	Italy	n.a.
<b>Helicopters</b>		
Bell UH-1 B/H (utility) .....	United States	69
CASA-MBB HA-15 (attack; reconnaissance) .....	Spain/West Germany	70
AB-206A; AB-212 (training; utility) .....	Italy	9
OH-58B (transport) .....	United States	12
CH-47 Chinook (transport) .....	-do-	18

n.a.—not available.

Source: Based on information from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1987-88*, London, 1987, 75.

Table 17. Major Naval Equipment, 1988

Type and Description	Origin	Number	Date Commissioned
<b>Aircraft carriers</b>			
<i>Dédalo</i> (eight Harriers; eight helicopters)	United States	1	1967 (to be retired)
<i>Príncipe de Asturias</i> (six-eight Harriers (V/STOL); eight helicopters)	Spain	1	1988
<b>Submarines</b>			
Agosta class	Spain/France	4	1983-86
Daphne class	-do-	4	1973-75
<b>Destroyers</b>			
Gearing class	United States	5	1945
Fletcher class	-do-	3	1943-44
<i>Roger de Lauria</i>	Spain	1	1959
<b>Frigates</b>			
FFG-7 class	-do-	3	1986-88
F-70 Baleares	-do-	5	1973-76
<b>Corvettes</b>			
Atrevida class	-do-	4	1954-60
Descubierta class	-do-	6	1978-82
Fast attack craft, missile armed	-do-	12	1975-78
Patrol craft, various types	-do-	79	various
<b>Minesweepers</b>			
Aggressive class (ocean)	United States	4	1953-54
Adjutant class (coastal)	-do-	8	1956-59
<b>Amphibious</b>			
Paul Revere class LPA <sup>1</sup>	-do-	2	1958-61
Cabildo class LSD <sup>2</sup>	-do-	1	1945
Landing craft, various types	Spain and United States	35	various
<b>Helicopters</b>			
AB-212 (command; reconnaissance)	Italy	12	n.a.
Sea King (antisubmarine)	United States	13	n.a.
Hughes 500M (antisubmarine)	-do-	11	n.a.

n.a.—not available.

<sup>1</sup> Amphibious Personnel Transport.<sup>2</sup> Landing Ship, Dock.

Source: Based on information from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1987-88*, London, 1987, 76; and *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1987-88*, London, 1987, 461-75.

Table 18. Major Air Force Equipment, 1987

Type and Description	Country of Origin	Number in Inventory
<b>Fighter-bomber-interceptors</b>		
F-4C and RF-4C Phantoms .....	United States	36
Mirage IIIE and IIID (trainer) .....	France	30
Mirage F1 .....	-do-	63
F-18 Hornets .....	United States (on order)	24 48
<b>Ground attack</b>		
SF-5 .....	Spain (assembly)	52
<b>Maritime reconnaissance</b>		
Orion P-3A .....	United States	6
Fokker F-27 .....	Netherlands	3
<b>Transport</b>		
C-130 Hercules .....	United States	5
KC-130 (aerial refueling) .....	-do-	6
CASA C-212 Aviocar .....	Spain	82
DHC-4 Caribou .....	United States	12
<b>Utility</b>		
Do-27 .....	West Germany	49
<b>Training</b>		
Beech T-34A Mentor .....	United States	24
Beech F-33A Bonanza .....	-do-	8
CASA C-101 .....	Spain	40
<b>Helicopters</b>		
Aérospatiale SA-319A Alouette III .....	France	6
Aérospatiale SA-330 Puma .....	-do-	6
Aérospatiale AS-332B Super Puma .....	Spain (assembly)	12
Agusta/Bell 205, 206 .....	Italy	17
Hughes 269A .....	United States	17
Bell CH-47 Chinook .....	-do-	25

Source: Based on information from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1987-88*, London, 1987, 76-77.

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## Glossary

**Council of Europe**—Founded in 1949 to foster parliamentary democracy, social and economic progress, and unity among its member states. Membership is limited to those European countries that respect the rule of law and the fundamental human rights and freedoms of all those living within their boundaries. As of 1988, its membership consisted of twenty-one West European countries.

**European Community (EC)**—also commonly called the Community)—The EC comprises three communities: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC, also known as the Common Market), and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). Each community is a legally distinct body, but since 1967 they have shared common governing institutions. The EC forms more than a framework for free trade and economic cooperation: the signatories to the treaties governing the communities have agreed in principle to integrate their economies and ultimately to form a political union. Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) are charter members of the EC. Britain, Denmark, and Ireland joined on January 1, 1973; Greece became a member on January 1, 1981; and Portugal and Spain entered on January 1, 1986.

**European Currency Unit (ECU)**—Instituted in 1979, the ECU is the unit of account of the EC (*q.v.*). The value of the ECU is determined by the value of a basket that includes the currencies of all EC member states. In establishing the value of the basket, each member's currency receives a share that reflects the relative strength and importance of the member's economy. In 1988 one ECU was equivalent to about one United States dollar.

**European Economic Community (EEC)**—See EC.

**European Free Trade Association (EFTA)**—Founded in 1961, EFTA aims at supporting free trade among its members and increasing the liberalization of trade on a global basis, but particularly within Western Europe. In 1988 the organization's member states were Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.

**Gross domestic product (GDP)**—The total value of goods and services produced by the domestic economy during a given period,

usually one year. Obtained by adding the value contributed by each sector of the economy in the form of profits, compensation to employees, and depreciation (consumption of capital). Most GDP usage in this book was based on GDP at factor cost. Real GDP is the value of GDP when inflation has been taken into account.

Gross national product (GNP)—Obtained by adding GDP (*q.v.*) and the income received from abroad by residents less payments remitted abroad to nonresidents. GNP valued at market prices was used in this book. Real GNP is the value of GNP when inflation has been taken into account.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established along with the World Bank (*q.v.*) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency affiliated with the United Nations that takes responsibility for stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. The main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members when they experience balance-of-payment difficulties. These loans often carry conditions that require substantial internal economic adjustments by the recipients.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)—Established in 1961 to replace the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, the OECD is an international organization composed of the industrialized market economy countries (twenty-four full members as of 1988). It seeks to promote economic and social welfare in member countries as well as in developing countries by providing a forum in which to formulate and to coordinate policies.

peseta—Basic Spanish currency unit. Consists of 100 centimos, but these are no longer in legal use. In terms of the United States dollar, the exchange rate averaged 60 pesetas in 1965, 56 pesetas in 1975, 79 pesetas in 1980, 126 pesetas in 1982, 173 pesetas in 1984, 154 pesetas in 1985, 134 pesetas in 1986, 107 pesetas in 1987, and 113 pesetas in 1988.

VAT—Value-added tax. A tax applied to the additional value created at a given stage of production and calculated as a percentage of the difference between the product value at that stage and the cost of all materials and services purchased as inputs. The VAT is the primary form of indirect taxation applied in the EEC (*q.v.*), and it is the basis of each country's contribution to the community budget.

World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of three affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance

Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage the growth of productive private enterprises in less developed countries. The president and certain senior officers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The three institutions are owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, member states must first belong to the IMF (*q.v.*).



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